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Property and Suffrage in the Early
American Republic
Robert J. Steinfeld*
I.

INTRODUCTION

In 1792, the state of New Hampshire amended its constitution to
exclude "paupers" from the suffrage.' Later, South Carolina (1810),
Maine (1819), Massachusetts (1821), Virginia (1829), Delaware (1831),
Rhode Island (1842), and New Jersey (1844) all followed suit. By the
end of the nineteenth century, fourteen states had excluded either
"paupers" generally or inmates of poorhouses from the suffrage. 2 As
late as 1934, all of these states continued to do so. 3 The term "pauper"
in these clauses ordinarily referred to persons in receipt of poor relief.
Typically, states adopted "pauper" exclusions as they moved to
eliminate formal property qualifications for the vote. Most commonly,
pauper exclusions were adopted as states replaced property qualifications with taxpaying qualifications. But in South Carolina (1810),
Maine (1819), New Jersey (1844), and Massachusetts (1853), 4 and in
Rhode Island's 1842 "People's Constitution," pauper exclusions were
* Associate Professor of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo. The author
wishes to thank James Atleson, Dianne Avery, Guyora Binder, David Engel, Alan Freeman,
Robert Gordon, Dirk Hartog, Duncan Kennedy, Fred Konefsky, Errol Meidinger, Betty
Mensch, andJack Schlegel for their encouragement and for their helpful suggestions. Errors,
needless to say, are mine alone. Initial work on this article was supported by the Magavern
Pool, Buffalo, New York. It was completed under a grant from The National Endowment for
the Humanities.
1. N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, art. 28 (1792) (reprint ed., Concord 1850). Recipients of
alms had been excluded from the Parliamentary franchise in some English boroughs all along.
See A. McKINLEY, THE SUFFRAGE FRANCHISE IN THE THIRTEEN ENGLISH COLONIES IN AMERICA
11 (1905); see also Thomas, The Levellers and the Franchise,in THE INTERREGNUM: THE QUEST FOR

SETLEMENT, 1646-1660, at 62-65 (G. Aylmer ed. 1972).
2. During the nineteenth century, Louisiana, Texas, West Virginia, Missouri, and
Oklahoma also enacted provisions to exclude either "paupers" or inmates of poorhouses,
from the suffrage. In 1877, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court interpreted a provision of Pennsylvania's 1873 Constitution to achieve a similar result. The court ruled that inmates of poorhouses were not entitled to vote in the districts in which their poorhouses were located.
Because inmates were generally not permitted to return home to vote, this ruling effectively
"deprived [them], for the time," as the court put it, "of their political privilege of voting."
Murray's Petition, 5 Weekly Notes of Cases 9, 9 (Pa. 1877) (interpreting PA. CONST. of 1873,
art. 8, § 13).
3. Further Poor Law Notes, 8 Soc. SERv. REV. 43 (1934).
4. The 1853 Massachusetts Constitution was ultimately rejected at a ratification election.
See 5 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 5 (W. Swindler ed. 1975)
[hereinafter STATE CONSTITUTIONS]; see also STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS 99 (C.
Browne ed. 1973).
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incorporated into constitutions which otherwise established white
"manhood" suffrage. 5
A. A Whig Interpretationof PauperExclusions
Why should Americans have been moved in the decades after the
Revolution to deprive recipients of poor relief of the vote? And why
should they have done so just at the time they were otherwise broadening the suffrage? One way of developing an explanation for these pauper clauses is to treat them as if they were merely anachronisms.
If we adopted this approach, we might say that the American
Revolution introduced a fundamentally new set of principles for organizing political life, but that these had not yet had time completely to
displace older views. We might say that after the Revolution the property qualifications of the colonial period began to give way to the notion that all men were entitled to the vote. But, we might add, these
new ideas faced a long struggle against older ways of thinking and only
gradually prevailed over many decades. We might show that first, taxpaying qualifications began to replace property qualifications. Then
white manhood suffrage was introduced. After the Civil War black men
were enfranchised. In the twentieth century, the slow march of progress finally brought women the vote, and, by the 1960s, had eliminated the last vestige of earlier restrictions on the franchise, the poll
tax. With the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the long struggle to establish the principle of universal adult suffrage had finally
achieved complete success.
If we accepted this all-too-familiar account of the history of the suffrage, 6 we would have a relatively straightforward answer to the question, why pauper exclusions? They were simply institutional
expressions of traditional ways of thinking which the Revolution had
failed to eliminate. Like other "anachronistic" suffrage practices which
survived into the new era, these too would eventually be eliminated by
the gradual spread of enlightened attitudes. Needless to say, such an
account would not be entirely wrong. As a nation, we have indeed
moved in a general way over the last century and a half from "property
to democracy," as one prominent historian has put it.7 And viewed in
isolation, pauper exclusions do in some sense represent the survival of
older ways of thinking. Paupers, after all, had been among those ex5. Historians of the suffrage sometimes mischaracterize the franchise in these states as
.'universal manhood suffrage." See, e.g., C. WILLIAMSON, AMERICAN SUFFRAGE: FROM PROPERTy
TO DEMOCRACY, 1760-1860, at 190 (1960).
6. Chilton Williamson's classic work, American Suffrage: From Properly To Democracy, is one
example of this kind of whig history. See id. But many constitutional law casebooks offer
implicit accounts which are very similar. Materials are arranged to suggest the gradual, progressive elimination of antiquated, feudal suffrage restrictions.
7. See id.
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cluded from the colonial franchise all along under the general property
qualifications of that era.
If we adopted this whig history of the suffrage, however, we would
be radically simplifying a vastly more complex process, and would be
engaging in the worst kind of ahistorical thinking. For in the decades
after the Revolution practically no one argued that the principles of the
Revolution demanded the introduction of universal suffrage. Pauper
exclusions were themselves an innovation. If we are to grasp how
Americans of this period regarded these exclusions, we must see that
for them, pauper exclusions were part of a fundamentally new set of
conceptions about who should exercise the franchise and who should
not. Far from being anachronisms, pauper exclusions were integral to
a new, nineteenth century way of defining full membership in a republican polity. This new set of conceptions was much more than a temporary weigh station on the road to universal suffrage. It was a selfcontained scheme of understandings about the proper order of the polity which developed at a particular moment in American history, in response to the deepest dilemmas facing American political culture in the
decades after the Revolution. And it was a set of basic conceptions
which endured in rough form for more than a century.
B.

The ContradictoryLegacy of the American Revolution

We can better understand this point by reexamining the process by
which the general property qualifications of the colonial era were gradually replaced with taxpaying qualifications and with provisions for
manhood suffrage. In many cases, these changes were accompanied by
the introduction of pauper exclusions.
By the middle of the eighteenth century, all the American colonies
save one had adopted property qualifications for the suffrage. 8 Colonists explained the disfranchisement of the propertyless in their midst
in part by observing that such people "had no wills of their own." 9
Under colonial restrictions all the propertyless, regardless of whether
they were wage earners or recipients of poor relief, occupied the same
political status. After the Revolution, as many states began to enfranchise some of those who owned no property, mainly wage earners
and leaseholders, under taxpaying or manhood suffrage provisions,
they began simultaneously to disfranchise others such as paupers. In
such states, the undifferentiated propertyless of the colonial era were
being separated into two distinct categories.
Some of the propertyless would henceforth be qualified to vote,
some would not. Of those who would not, it was no longer sufficient
merely to say that they could not vote because, being propertyless, they
"had no wills of their own." Something more had to distinguish them
8. See notes 12-15 infra and accompanying text.
9. See notes 16-25 infra and accompanying text.
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from the others who were being enfranchised. In other words, as some
of the propertyless were enfranchised and others were explicitly disfranchised, it became necessary to redefine not only the former but also
the latter. Much more was involved than the simple persistence of
traditional attitudes in the new era.
As the traditional undifferentiated propertyless were divided into
two groups, the new political-cultural categories of independent wage
earner and dependent pauper emerged together, defining each other
by mutual contrast. Whatever qualities now seemed to define paupers
as dependent, it was the absence of those qualities which made it seem
possible to view propertyless wage earners as independent.
It was no accident that this division of the traditional world of the
propertyless began to occur at this particular moment in American history. The movement toward distinguishing among the traditional
propertyless developed as one response to the contradictory legacy of
the American Revolution. That legacy had left American political culture embracing fundamentally inconsistent premises. To state the dilemma in its simplest terms: On the one hand, Americans continued to
adhere to the classical republican notion that only property ownership
conferred independence on a man. On the other hand, they had also
come to believe that "all men were by nature equally free and independent
and had certain inherent and unalienable rights." 10 One view pointed
toward a world in which all men, whether or not they owned property,
were assumed by nature to be free and independent, and capable of
political discretion. The other assumed that the polity was divided at
bottom into two groups, those who owned property and those who did
not. According to this view, the propertyless should never exercise
political authority precisely because they were not free and independent agents.
These two views led to contradictory visions of political order.
What we must understand, however, is that at bottom most Americans
simultaneously believed some version of both. New York City and Philadelphia artisans of the era may have agitated for a broadening of the
suffrage on the ground that all men were by nature equally free and
independent,1" but there can be little question that most of them also
believed that only property ownership conferred real independence on
a man.
As Americans struggled over the question of broadening the suffrage in the decades after the Revolution, they simultaneously struggled with these deeply inconsistent premises. The division of the
10. See note 63 infra and accompanying text.
11. See note 56 infra and accompanying text; see also E. FONER, TOM PAINE AND REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA 142-44 (1976); S. WiLENrz, CHANTS DEMOCRATIC: NEW YORK CITY AND THE
RISE OF THE AMERICAN WORKING CLASS, 1788-1850, at 65-66, 70-71 (1984); H. ROCK, ARTISANS OF THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE TRADESMEN OF NEW YORK CITY IN THE AGE OFJEFFERSON 4951 (1979).
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traditionally undifferentiated propertyless into two new categories defined as binary opposites of one another represented an accommodation of these fundamental, yet inconsistent, premises of American life.
To fully understand the genesis of these developments, however, we
must go back to an earlier point in time. We must begin by considering
the position of the propertyless in early modem Anglo-American society. We must also develop an understanding of the complex connections which existed in that society between property ownership and
self-government. Only then can we grasp the problem which confronted Americans as they struggled over the question of broadening
the franchise. And only then can we understand the kind of answer
which pauper exclusions represented.
II.

THE DISFRANCHISEMENT OF THE PROPERTYLESS
IN THE AMERICAN COLONIES

By the middle of the eighteenth century all American colonies save
one had adopted election laws which denied the colony franchise to
those who owned no property. 12 This development had taken more
than a century to complete, for in the seventeenth century, property
qualifications had by no means been the norm. 13 But by the time of the
12. See A. McKINLEY, supra note 1, at 478, 481. In a number of colonies which adopted
property qualifications, exceptions were made for inhabitants of certain towns. In New York
State, for example, those who had been "admitted to the freedom" of Albany and New York
City were entitled to vote without more. W. ADAMS, THE FIRsT AMERICAN CONsTrrTUTIONS:
REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONsTrrUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY

ERA app. at 298 (1980). In Virginia, "housekeepers" in Williamsburg and Norfolk could vote
if they had served to any trade for five years. Id at 303. In New Jersey, inhabitants of the
towns of Perth Amboy and Burlington could vote if they were "householders." Id at 299.
For a summary of these provisions, see id at 293-307. These exceptions harken back to a
borough basis for the franchise common in the seventeenth century. See note 13 infra.
13. Following English practice, in the seventeenth century the American colonies
adopted a number of different voting qualification schemes. In England, the 40-shilling freehold qualification only applied to the county Parliamentary franchise. The borough Parliamentary franchise was much more diverse. In some boroughs property ownership was not
required at all. "At the outset," Albert McKinley says of the colonial franchise,
the suffrage in most of the colonies conformed to the voter's qualifications in the
English towns rather than to the freehold requisite of the English county. Thus in
New England... the freeman principle of the English boroughs became the basis of
the suffrage. [In the southern colonies] ... the early suffrage... [was] similar to the
franchise in those English towns where all adult male housekeepers participated in
elections.
A. McKINLEY, supra note 1, at 484-85.
But over the course of the seventeenth century, the basis of the colonial franchise began
to shift decisively in the direction of property qualifications. McKinley observes that in both
New England and the Southern states,
the holding of land came [after a time] to be the sole qualification, or an alternative
one with the ownership of personal property. And in this process the borough basis
of freemanship or inhabitancy gave place to the ownership of property; that is, a
qualification akin to the county franchise in England.

Id. at 485.
By the eighteenth century, property qualifications had been adopted almost everywhere
in the American colonies. But some of the colonies retained exceptions based on the earlier
borough franchise for inhabitants of certain towns. See note 12 supra.
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Revolution only South Carolina retained a taxpaying qualification for
the vote. 14 In all other colonies, election laws excluded the propertyless from the suffrage without distinction. 15
As mentioned earlier, writers in this period frequently explained the
disfranchisement of the propertyless by observing that those without
property were not free agents.' 6 Those who owned no property were
powerless and dependent; they were nearly always subject to the will of
those who commanded resources. Because they were not their own
men, they lacked political capacity. The political community simply
could not trust such men with the important task of selecting magistrates or legislative representatives because they could never exercise
independent judgment. They would always be compelled to do the
bidding of the wealthy.
These views prevailed all across the political spectrum in England
and in the colonies in the eighteenth century. In a comment which
Americans frequently cited, 17 Blackstone, for example, wrote of the
franchise that
[t]he true reason of requiring any qualification, with regard to property, in voters, is to exclude such persons as are in so mean a situation
that they are esteemed to have no will of their own. If these persons
had votes, they would be tempted to dispose of them under some undue influence or other. This would give a great, an artful, or a wealthy
man, a 8 larger share in elections than is consistent with general
liberty.'
14. A. McKINLEY, supra note 1, at 481.
15. The right to elect representatives did not play the central role in the eighteenth
century which it subsequently assumed in the nineteenth century. In the colonies, it began to
take on increasing importance as the American Revolution progressed. See G. WOOD, THE
CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776-1787, at 134-35, 163 n.2 (1969).
16. Contemporaries offered other explanations as well for restricting the suffrage to
those who owned property. "Implicit also in English suffrage theory was the belief, as old as
the emergence of the House of Commons itself, that so long as the landowners directly paid
the bulk of public taxes it was not inequitable or unjust to confine Commons' elections to
them." C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 5-6. Similar notions (which sometimes acknowledged

the financial contributions of owners of personal property) also played roles in shaping the
practice of American colonial suffrage. See id. at 6-7.
In addition, many also believed that the ownership of a freehold (some would have added
"a visible personal estate") tied a man to the interests of the community. As Governor William Markham of Pennsylvania told the new members of his council in 1696: "You are all men
that are fastened to the country by visible estates. . .and that's a great security you will study
the interest of the country." W. ADAMS, supra note 12, at 211 n.84. For a summary of the
major justifications advanced for linking rights of suffrage to property ownership, see id at
207-17.
17. See C. WILIAMSON, supra note 5, at 12. Alexander Hamilton, for example, paraphrased Blackstone in A. HAMILTON, THE FARMER REFUTED (New York 1775), reprintedin 1 A.
HAMILTON, THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81, 106 (H. Syrett &J. Cooke eds. 1961).
18. 1 W. BtACESTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *171 (1765) [hereinafter COMMENTARIES].
If it were probable that every man would give his vote freely and without influence of
any kind, then, upon the true theory and genuine principles of liberty, every member
of the community, however poor, should have a vote in electing those delegates, to
whose charge is committed the disposal of his property, his liberty, and his life. But,
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Blackstone emphasized that those without property lacked autonomy
and would inevitably fall under the sway of others.' 9 Since, in his view,
only "free agents" could be allowed to vote, 20 the propertyless could
not be enfranchised.
In the colonies, John Adams expressed a nearly identical view.
"Such is the frailty of the human heart," he wrote,
that very few men who have no property, have any judgment of their
own. They talk and vote as they are directed by some man of property,
who has attached their minds to his interest ....

[They are] to all

intents and purposes as much dependent upon others, who will please
to feed, clothe, and employ them,
as women are upon their husbands,
2
or children on their parents. '
But such views were also held at the other end of the eighteenth
century political spectrum. Even many radicalEnglish whigs firmly believed that the propertyless were not fit to exercise political authority.
Joseph Priestley, for example, wrote that "those who are extremely dependent should not be allowed to have votes.., because this might...
be only throwing more votes into the hands of those persons on whom
22
they depend."
As we now know, eighteenth century whig thought played a critical
role in American political culture during the Revolutionary period.
American whigs, like their English counterparts, continued to regard
the politically relevant "people as a unitary, property-holding, homoge",23
neous body-not 'the vile populace or rabble of the country ....
To eighteenth century whigs, in fact, property represented much more
than material possessions. It represented "the attributes of a man's
24
personality that gave him a political character."
These views on the political significance of property were common
throughout the colonies. In 1775, one Pennsylvanian, for example, declared that, "[a] Civil Society or State is a number of proprietors of land
within certain limits, united by a compact or mutual agreement, for
making laws and appointing persons to execute these laws for their
'

since that can hardly be expected in persons of indigentfortunes, or such as are under the

immediate dominion of others, all popular states have been obliged to establish certain
qualifications; whereby some, who are suspected to have no will of their own, are excluded from voting, in order to set other individuals, whose wills may be supposed independent, more thoroughly upon a level with each other.
Id (emphasis added).
19. Id; see note 18 supra.

20. He stated that "[o]nly such are entirely excluded, as can have no will of their own:
there is hardly afree agent to be found, but what is entitled to a vote in some place or other in
the kingdom." Id. at * 172 (emphasis added).
21. 9 J. ADAMS, THE WORKS OF JOHN ADAMS 376-77 (C. Adams ed. 1864) (letter from

John Adams to James Sullivan, May 26, 1776).
22. J. PRIESTLEY, AN ESSAY ON THE FIRST PRINCIPLES OF GOVERNMENT 13 (2d ed. 1771).

For other writers who held similar views, see G. WooD, supra note 15, at 168-69.
23. G. WooD, supra note 15, at 62.
24. Idt at 219.
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common benefit." 25 In the decades after the Revolution, hardly anyone disputed the proposition that property ownership was necessary
for personal independence. And if independence was a prerequisite for
political participation, as many Americans thought it should be, then
those who owned no property could not reasonably expect to participate in political life.
III.

PROPERTY AND SELF-GOVERNMENT: RELATIONSHIPS OF
DEPENDENCE IN THE EARLY MODERN PERIOD

A. Economic/Social Relationships of Dependence and Governance
When eighteenth century writers of practically all political hues insisted that the propertyless should not vote because they were governed by other men, we must understand that their views were based
squarely on their experience of life in their world. Today, we view the
power over persons which property ownership confers as an embarrassment.2 6 While we are frequently forced to acknowledge it, we also go
to great lengths to conceal it. Before the nineteenth century, little need
was seen for such concealment. The inhabitants of that world frankly
acknowledged and openly exercised the power over others which property ownership conferred.
In the early modern period, a wide range of adult relationships of
dependence were considered normal. Hardly anyone questioned the
right of persons who controlled resources to use those resources to create relationships of dependence. Such relationships were grounded in
the notion that those who controlled resources might extend their protection and care to those who did not. The latter, in return, would owe
loyalty and obedience. They were expected to serve their protectors
and do their bidding. Those who controlled no resources had little
choice about the matter. They frequently had to enter one of these
relationships and submit to the government of others, simply in order
to survive.
Explicit relationships of dependence were a common feature of social life at all levels, both in Europe 2 7 and America. In late colonial
25. C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 6.
26. For modem discussions of the power over persons which property ownership confers, see Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927), and Hale, Coercion and
Distributionin a Supposedly Non-coercive State, 38 POL. ScI. . 470 (1923).
27. In a vivid essay on literary life under the French ancien regime, Robert Darton draws
on the files of a police inspector charged with keeping literary figures under surveillance to
reconstruct the "common subjectivity, [the] social construction of reality," shared by the
French of the eighteenth century. The inspector's files reveal a literary culture based on a
system of clientage, protection, and dependence.
Just as Mme de Pompadour got Bernis an abbey, Bernis got Duclos a sinecure. That
was how the system worked. The police did not question the principle of influence
peddling. They assumed it: it went without saying, in the republic of letters as in
society at large.
R. DARNTON, A Police InspectorSorts His Files, in THE GREAT CAT MASSACRE AND OTHER EPISODES
IN FRENCH CULTURAL HISTORY 165 (1984).
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New York City, for example, a system of personal loyalty and "economic clientage" was well established. 28 "[Numerous artisans] were
beholden to merchants, lawyers, and urban landholders who controlled
their rents, job opportunities, credit, and even personal affairs .... -29
Such dependence frequently translated into political loyalty. "Even
dewith secret balloting many artisans cast their votes as their patron
30
preferences."
political
one's
hide
to
easy
not
was
it
for
sired,
In this world, social deference and material necessity converged to
place some men explicitly under the control of other men. Even versions of the European aristocratic form were to be found in the colonies. In the Mohawk District of New York State, for example, a 1773
election for five constables has been described this way:
There was no shortage of qualified electors; at least four hundred men
in the district possessed the franchise. But only fourteen turned out
for the election, and all of them voted for the same five candidates.
Every one of the fourteen voters has been shown to have been closely
tied to Sir William [the chief land owner in the area], whether by interest, patronage, or economic dependency. This was local democracy in
a county where the jail, the courthouse, and the Anglican church were
that man received letall the personal property of one man and where
3
ters headed "May it Please Your Lordship." '
Stephen Innes has recently shown that in seventeenth century
Springfield, Massachusetts, John Pynchon, the leading landowner, established relationships of dependence with nearly fifty percent of the
town's adult male inhabitants. 3 2 "As patron, John Pynchon exchanged
the fruits of his status, power, influence, and authority for the loyalty
and political support of the client .... Those tenants whose rent was in
arrears, men chronically indebted to Pynchon, or wage laborers dependent on him for long-term or seasonal employment were not likely to
oppose his wishes in town meeting, on the muster green, or anywhere
else." 33 "[N]either patron nor client," Innes goes on to add, "found
this kind of asymmetrical relationship unusual or demeaning. [A client]
knew that he was joined by roughly half the town's men in dependency
The constant unremitting quest for protection stands out everywhere in [the
inspector's] accounts of literary careers ....
Such were the facts of literary life. [The inspector] recorded them unblinkingly,
without any moralizing about toadyism among the writers or the vanity of protectors.
On the contrary, he sounded shocked when a proteg6 deviated from the unswerving
loyalty he owed his patron.
Id at 167-68.

28. G. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS, AND THE
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 366 (1979).
29. I
30. Id.
31. E. COUNTRYMAN, A PEOPLE IN REVOLUTION: THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION AND POLrrICAL SoCIETY IN NEW YORK, 1760-1790, at 33 (1981) (citations omitted).
32. S. INNES, LABOR IN A NEW LAND: ECONOMY AND SOCIETY IN SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY
SPRINGFIELD 38, 42, 208-27 (1983).

33. Id at 40.
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4

' '3
on Pynchon.
The obsessive preoccupation of eighteenth century Anglo-American
whigs with dependence reflects the social reality of the era.3 5 In England and the colonies property ownership conferred a power over
others which was freely acknowledged and openly exercised in a wide
variety of relationships of dependence.

B.

Legal Relationships of Dependence and Governance

For the very poor in this period (and for women and children), the
situation was even worse. They frequently found themselves in a form
of dependence relationship that was even more rigorous. For if social
convention dictated that property owners were entitled to command
the loyalty of those to whom they extended care and protection, it was a
matter of legal doctrine that heads of household were entitled to command the loyalty and services of those for whom they provided. Household dependents not only included wives and children, but also
propertyless wage earners who lived with the master. Before the nineteenth century in the colonies,
most propertyless people were dependents in a propertied household-wives, children, slaves, servants, apprentices, journeyman, hired
laborers. Apart from these groups, a smaller number of tenant farmers, common seamen and casual laborers set up independent households without a property owner as the head. But for the most part,
the property owners and the propertyless was a doinequality between
36
mestic affair.
In the legal relationships of dependence (master and servant, husband and wife, parent and child) of this period, the head of household
was responsible for the maintenance, care and protection of all his dependents. They could bring a variety of legal actions to enforce the
duty of support which he owed them. 3 7 But in return, he was given, in
34. Id. at 42.
35. G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 143-58.
36. A. DAWLEY, CLASS AND COMMUNITY: THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION IN LYNN 61 (1976).
37. In eighteenth century England, for example,
[t]he contract [between master and servant for an indefinite period] implicitly bound
the servant to serve the master for the year, and to obey his reasonable commands,
and it bound the master to maintain the servant for the year and to pay the wages
agreed upon, whether or not there was daily work for the servant, and whether or not
the servant remained fit to work. As Burn advised justices of the Peace, "if a servant
retained for the year falls sick, or is hurt or disabled, by act of God or the master's
business, he is not to be put away nor his wages to be abated.'" The large number
of Quarter Sessions' order to take back sick and injured servants and to maintain
them to the end of the term attests both to the enforceable nature of the contract and
to the frequency with which it was broken.
A. KUSSMAUL, SERVANTS IN HUSBANDRY IN EARLY MODERN ENGLAND 32 (1981) (quoting R.
BURN, THEJUSTICE OF PEACE (London 1775)) (citations omitted).
Similarly, in the seventeenth century Plymouth colony, "[t]he master's basic responsibilities continued unaltered even if his servant experienced some serious.., misfortune.... He
was bound to protect his servant's welfare to the full extent of his ability, until the end of the
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varying degrees, legal jurisdiction or control over them. This jurisdiction included rights to their services, and even, in certain cases, rights
to chastise or confine them. The structure of these legal household relationships of dependence closely resembled the structure of other relationships of dependence common in this period. On the one hand,
the law imposed on heads of household duties to support and protect
their dependents. On the other hand, it extended to them varying degrees of control over their persons and energies.38
This reciprocal set of duties was at the heart of all versions of these
legal relations of dependence. Persons unable to fulfill their duty of
support often lost the right to govern their dependents. Early English
master/servant law, for example, declared that "[i]f a Man who is not
able nor sufficient to keep a Servant, shall retain a Servant, such Retainer is void." 3 9 A similar kind of rule applied to parents. Parents who
could not support their children were liable to have them removed by
overseers of the poor and placed into service. As one nineteenth century court declared in a custody dispute between a father and overseers
of the poor:
It seems very clear to us, that the father could not come forward and
claim to exercise the rights of a parent and natural guardian, and control and direct as to the custody and disposition of the boy, until he was
also prepared to assume the obligations 40
and liabilities of the same relation, and furnish the means of support.
One of the crucial points to understand about the propertyless who
became recipients of poor relief in this period is that when they accepted assistance, they too entered this kind of legal relationship of dependence. The relationship of towns to their "paupers," was structured
in exactly the same way as the relationship of heads of household to
their dependents. Both were reciprocal relationships in which one
party owed a duty of support and the other owed a duty of loyalty and
service in return.
Towns are bound by law to support all such of their inhabitants as may
contracted terms; there was no shortening of this term except by mutual agreement." J. DEMos, A LrrrLE COMMONWEALTH: FAMILY LIFE IN PLYMOUTH COLONY 109-10 (1970) (citations
omitted). But see S. INNES, supra note 32, at 111, for an example of a servant in seventeenth
century Springfield, Massachusetts who paid for his own "diet."
For a discussion of similar arrangements in the colonies during the eighteenth century,
see Salinger, Artisans,Journeymen, and the Transformation of Labor in Late Eighteenth-Century Philadelphia, 40 WM. & MARY Q. 62, 76 (1983). See also G. NASH, supra note 29, at 259; R. Moss,

Master Builders: A History of the Colonial Philadelphia Building Trades 143-46 (Ph.D. diss.,
Univ. of Delaware, 1972).
38. For a summary of the law governing these household relationships during this pe-

riod, see 1 COMMENTARIES, supra note 18, at *423. For an extended discussion and analysis of
the law governing master/servant relationships, see R. Steinfeld, The Disappearance of Indentured Servitude and the Invention of Free Labor in the United States (1986) (unpublished
manuscript) (on file with the Stanford Law Review).

39. M. DALTON, THE COUNTREYJUSTICE: CONTAINING THE PRACTICE OF THEJUSTICES OF
THE PEACE OUT OF THEIR SESSIONS 127 (London 1682).
40. Houston v. Kimball, 22 Vt. 575, 580 (1850).
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from time to time fall into distress and stand in need of relief, and to.
continue such support so long as it may be needed; and during its continuance they are entitled to the reasonable services of those supported
by them ....The rights and duties of towns and paupersare correlative. While
the town supports the pauper, the pauper is bound to laborfor the town. But
when the support becomes unnecessary, the right to control the labor
ceases.41

In the contract by which the caretakers in this case "took the care and
custody of the poor of the town," they vowed, in words which evoke a
husband's vow, that they would "support comfortably and decently, in sickness

and in health, all the paupers who shall be chargeable upon the town
....

"42

And like a head of household, they were also "to have the

'43
reasonable service and labor of the paupers.
It is no accident that the relationship of dependence between towns
and paupers paralleled the relationship of dependence between heads
of household and dependents. Today, we might classify these two
kinds of relationships very differently, characterizing one as private and
41. Wilson v. Brooks, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 341, 343 (1833) (emphasis added).
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, selectmen or overseers of the poor
placed paupers with individual families, generally for a year at a time. These families would
receive some cash for the care of the pauper and not infrequently rights to his or her labor.
"Richard Dodge, Jr., for example, a Weniham farmer, contracted with selectmen 'to keep Elisabeth Senie and her youngest Child ...for the Consideration of twenty shillings and what
Labour She can do During the Sd Term.'" Jones, The Transformation of the Law of Povery in
Eighteenth-Century Massachussetts, in LAW INCOLONIAL MASSACHUSSETrS, 1630-1800, at 153, 159
(1984). Similarly, in 1693, George Keetch agreed with the town council of Providence, Rhode
Island, that he would "take Edward London into his Care & Keepeing [and would] find the
said Ed: London sufficiently with meat, drinke washing & Lodgeing ...." In return, he was
granted "fifty shillings in Currant pay at monie price" and "said Londons Labour in what he
may Comfortably doe." M. CREECH, THREE CENTURIES OF POOR LAw ADMINISTRATION: A
STUDY OF LEGISLATION IN RHODE ISLAND 306 (reprint ed. 1969).
By the beginning of the nineteenth century, however, many towns began to adopt a harsher version of this long standing practice. They began to auction off the poor of the town in
lots. The lowest bidders would receive cash compensation and rights to the paupers' labor.
See id at 164-94; see also J. PRUDE, THE COMING OF INDUSTRIAL ORDER: TOWN AND FACTORY
LIFE IN RURAL MASSACHUSSETrS, 1810-1860, at 28 (1983).
In the eigtheenth century, a number of locales had established almshouses. Paupers who
were maintained in these, needless to say, were also obligated to work. Jones, supra, at 16471.
Recipients of temporary outdoor relief might not be under the kind of control custodial
paupers were, but in many jurisdictions they too owed labor to the town.
A person is to be considered a pauper while he receives supplies, as such, from the
town where he is resident or found, whether for a year, or a portion of a year,
whether in an alms house, or at his own dwelling; and whether furnished directly by
the overseers of the poor, or indirectly by the person to whom he has been disposed
of and consigned by such overseers for support, in consideration of his services for a
year, or any less period. We are of this opinion, because in each of the situations
above described, the pauper is dependent upon the town, and under the care and
protection, if not the personal control, of the overseers ....Nor do we consider that
it is material whether the pauper makes compensation by his labor to the person to
whom he has been consigned, or to the overseers of the poor when they directly
support him ....
7 Me. 497, 499 (1831) (advisory opinion).
42. 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) at 341 (emphasis added).
43. Id
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domestic, the other as public and political. But at an earlier time, that
distinction was not made so sharply.
In this period, relationships of dependence, whether formalized in
law or only a matter of social convention, were essentially based on a
similar idea. Persons who controlled resources might extend their protection and care to others. In return, these others would incur obligations to serve and obey their protectors and providers. But in the legal
relationships of dependence, these obligations of service and obedience assumed a more stringent form. The power over persons stemming from control over resources took the form of legal jurisdiction.
We might almost say that in these relationships the power of property
was "established."
C. Political Relationships of Dependence and Governance
There were a number of reasons why those living in this period so
frankly acknowledged and openly exercised the power over persons
conferred by property. Governance had not yet been restricted exclusively to governments. Though some contemporaries were growing increasingly uncomfortable with the idea that some individuals were
entitled to the personal government of other individuals, such a notion
was still common. But there was perhaps an even more basic reason.
Government itself, in this period, was frequently viewed as a relation44
ship of dependence between a ruler and his subjects.
And this relationship of rulers to subjects was not thought to be
fundamentally different from other relationships involving dependence
and governance. Like these other relationships, that of ruler and subject was also understood to be based on a set of reciprocal obligations:
a duty of protection on one side, a duty of allegiance and loyalty on the
other. It too was understood to be a relationship which mixed government with care and protection. "[F]or as the subject oweth to the king
his true and faithful ligeance and obedience," Lord Coke observed, "so
the sovereign is to govern and protect his subjects."' 45 "[P]ower and
protection," he went on, "draweth ligeance. ' '4 6 Political relationships
thus bore a striking structural resemblance to other relationships of dependence. 4 7 On the very eve of the Revolution, Americans still
thought about their relationship to the King in this way. When, for
example, American polemicists sought to justify the separation of the
44. See E. MORGAN, THE PURITAN FAMILY: RELIGION & DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN SEVEN-

TEENTH CENTURY NEW ENGLAND 19-20 (rev. ed. 1966); see also G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 26971, 282.
45. J. KETrNER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF AMERICAN CITIZENSHIP, 1608-1870, at 18 (1978)
(quoting Calvin's Case, 7 Coke's Reporter la, 4b (1608)).
46. Id (quoting Calvin's Case, 7 Coke's Reporter at 9b).
47. "The natural community of allegiance,"James Kettner has noted, "was the aggregation of all those reciprocal relationships of allegiance and protection between individual subjects and the king. It resembled the natural family, where a common paternity made sons and
daughters into brothers and sisters .... " Id. at 23.
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colonies from England, they argued that "by withdrawing his protection and levying war upon us, [the King] has discharged us of our allegiance, and of all obligations to obedience: For protection and
'4 8
subjection are mutual, and cannot subsist a part [sic]."

In the decades following the Revolution, some Americans argued
that the propertyless should not have the vote because they were dependent on others and had no wills of their own. But we must remember that they were still very close to a world in which property owners
were thought to be entitled to establish open relationships of dependence, and to command, in these relationships, those to whom they had
granted access to their resources. These Americans were still very
close to a universe in which those without property had virtually no
choice about entering such relationships of dependence. Only when
the idea that all men were entitled to govern themselves began to call
into question the legitimacy of the links between property, dependence,
and governance-only then did the power of government conferred by
property begin to create a political dilemma of the first order. And only
then did this power begin to require concealment.
IV.
A.

THE PROBLEM OF POLITICAL RIGHTS AND PROPERTY OWNERSHIP
IN A REPUBLICAN POLITY

The Rise of the Norm of Self-Government in English Republicanism and
Liberal Individualism

In the Anglo-American world of the seventeenth century, the relationships of ruler and subject, master and servant, husband and wife,
parent and child, defined the very essence of social and political order.
Seventeenth century New England Puritans, for example, believed that
social and political life was a matter of
the superiority of husband over wife, parents over children, and master
over servants in the family, ministers and elders over congregation in
the church, rulers over subjects in the state .... In each relationship

God had ordained that one party be superior, the other inferior; for
when he said, "Honor thy father and thy mother," he
meant spiritual
49
and political as well as natural fathers and mothers.
In the world they inhabited, these relationships paralleled one another
in the different realms of life. All were viewed as the same basic kind of
mixed public/private relationship of dependence and governance. And
in all of these relationships, property and government sat easily beside
one another.
A speech delivered by John Winthrop to the Massachusetts General
Court illustrates just how natural it seemed to seventeenth century New
Englanders to associate relationships of dependence in one area of life
48. G. WooD, supra note 15, at 270 & n.19 (quoting Lettersfrom a Farmerin WRITINGS
DICKINSON 310 (Ford ed. 1970)).
49. E. MORGAN, supra note 44, at 19.

OF
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with those in another. Winthrop observed that a good subject resembled a good wife. Subjects elected magistrates to rule them. Wives selected husbands. Once each had chosen, both were in the same
position. "[T]he woman's own choice makes such a man her husband;
yet being so chosen, he is her lord, and she is to be subject to him, yet
in a way of liberty, not of bondage; and a true wife accounts her subjection her honor and freedom.. .."50
But during the seventeenth century another set of basic conceptions
began to develop and to penetrate Anglo-American culture. Self-government came to be celebrated as a fundamental value which social and
political order ought to protect and advance. This new norm played a
basic role in two of the most important ideological movements to
emerge in the seventeenth century: English republicanism and liberal
5
individualism. '
In both of these early modern movements, however, there was considerable tension between the abstract norm of self-government and its
elaboration in the detailed arrangements of social life. English republicanism, for example, celebrated personal independence as the virtue
which made genuinely human community possible and vilified dependence as a source of corruption. Yet at the same time, it took for
granted that self-government could not be the lot of all mankind. It
relegated the propertyless to the degraded status of permanent
dependence.
And unlike traditional hierarchy, which considered dependence the
naturallot of much of mankind, republicanism considered dependence
a corruption of the best qualities of human personality. It should come
as no surprise, then, that the republicanism of this period pointed in
different directions. It served to reinforce traditional hierarchical relationships of dependence even as it spread values which progressively
undermined them. Even the propertyless would find it hard to accept
dependence as a corrupt rather than a natural condition.
Liberal individualism celebrated the norm of self-government in a
different way. The liberal universe was composed of equal, separate,
and autonomous individuals. In this universe, all men by nature were
assumed to be equally free and independent. Liberalism conceived of
organized social and political life as a fundamental compact among all
these individuals. Like the republicanism of the early modern era, however, liberal individualism also pointed in different directions. On the
one hand, some individuals, such as women and children, were thought
50. K. LOCKRIDGE, A NEW ENGLAND TOWN, THE FIRST HUNDRED YEARS: DEDHAM, MASSACHUSETrS, 1636-1736, at 53 (1970) (quoting Winthrop).
51. On Anglo-American republicanism during this period, seeJ. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION
(1975). For liberal individualism, see 1. SHAPIRO, THE EVOLUTION OF RIGHTS IN LIBERAL THEORY (1986). See also C. MACPHERSON, THE POLITICAL THEORY OF POSSESSIVE INDIVIDUALISM,
HOBBES TO LOCKE (1962).
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to lack the basic capacity to govern themselves. Others, such as servants and hirelings, had contracted their autonomy away. On the other
hand, the ultimate objective remained to design social and political institutions which would promote, to the maximum extent possible, the
natural autonomy of all individuals regardless of their social or economic status.
B.

The Decline of TraditionalRelationships of Dependence: The Invention of
the Self-Governing People and the Independent Wage Earner

Despite the basic tensions in each of these movements, the gradual
spread of the norm of self-government did begin to have a significant
impact on American life. The new values played a role in the complex
processes which, by the nineteenth century, led to a basic reconceptualization of two of the principal traditional relationships of dependence:
ruler and subject, and master and servant.
The traditional political concept of ruler and subject did not survive
the American Revolution. In its place, Americans began to conceive
their polity in a fundamentally new way, in terms of a Lockean social
compact. Gordon Wood has written of this transformation that, as the
Revolution unfolded, "It]he mutual contract between rulers and ruled
began to seem inoperable once the character and obligations of the two
parties overlapped and combined and became indistinguishable." 5 2
These developments culminated in the first principle of post-Revolutionary political culture: popular sovereignty. In place of the traditional relationship of ruler and subject, Americans had established the
self-governing people as the ultimate source of political order.
At the same time, the Revolution advanced the transformation of
another one of the traditional relationships of dependence. Though
52. G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 283. Wood explains:
There was, however, another contractual analogy that ran through the Whig mind of
the eighteenth century. This was the idea of the social compact, the conceptionJohn
Locke had developed in his Second Treatise on Civil Government, not a governmental
contract between magistrates and people, rulers and ruled, but an agreement among
isolated individuals in a state of nature to combine in a society-a social compact
which by its very character was anterior to the formation of government ....Under
the changing exigencies of their polemics and politics, Americans needed some new
contractual analogy to explain their evolving relationships among themselves and
with the state. Only a social agreement among the people, only such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense of their rapidly developing idea of a constitution as a
fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from and controlling of all
the institutions of government.
Id. (citations omitted). As Wood describes the transition:
[T]he constitution could no longer be intelligibly regarded as a contract, like Magna
Carta, between rulers and people. All authority in all parts of the government was
equivalently derived from the people, "through the medium of that constitutional
compact, which binds them together in one body." The constitution was not a bargain between two parties but had become the very basis of the society, and because
"established by the people, it is stronger than any law the assembly can make, it
being the foundation whereon they stand."
Id. at 290 (quoting Adams, Sermon Preached, May 29, 1782, at 21).
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the process would not be complete until sometime in the nineteenth
century, the master/servant relationship also underwent reconceptualization. In the place of a hierarchical relationship of dependence and
governance, employment would become a purely contractual engagement between juridical equals. Employees would be understood to retain the legal right to govern themselves under all circumstances. 53 As
one Massachusetts man of the mid-nineteenth century explained:
In a free government like ours, employment is simply a contract between parties having equal rights. The operative agrees to perform a
certain amount of work in consideration of receiving a certain amount
of money ....

The employed is under no greater obligation to the

employer than the employer is to the employed; and the one has no
more right to dictate [outside of work] than the other. In the eye of the
law, they are both freemen-citizens
having equal rights, and brethren
54
having one common destiny.
As the American Revolution proceeded, the abstract proposition
that by nature all men were entitled to govern themselves became a
central tenet of American political culture. Americans, however, could
not completely foresee how difficult it would prove to square this proposition with the generally accepted truth that only those who owned
property could ever expect to be genuinely independent.
C. The Framework of the Suffrage Debate
In the decades after the Revolution, most Americans accepted the
idea that only people who governed themselves were entitled to claim
membership in the "self governing people." People controlled and
dominated by others simply could not be trusted with the important
task of selecting magistrates and legislative representatives. As Gordon
53. For an extended version of this argument see generally R. Steinfeld, supra note 38.
For an account of transformations wrought in the relationship between masters and their
journeymen in the decades after the Revolution, see S. WiLENTz, supra note 11, at 23-103.
The account of changes in the master-servant relationship offered here represents a considerable simplification. In another place, I argue that the early modem English and American master-servant relationship was actually composed of a number of distinct legal statuses:
apprentice, household servant, day laborer, and artificer. Each of these statuses had its own
legal incidents. The legal power of masters was considerably greater in some than in others.
What all these statuses shared, however, was that at the time the American colonies were
settled, all of them required workmen not to depart before they had performed their agreements. While wage-earners were engaged, therefore, none retained complete legal control
over their own persons. Over time these statuses changed at different rates, so that by the
eighteenth century in the American colonies, day laborers and artisans seem no longer to
have operated under the legal injunction not to depart. But some kinds of servants continued
to operate under that injunction much longer. It was not until sometime in the nineteenth
century that all these statuses were reduced to a single, homogeneous legal category of employment. It was only then that the employment relationship became a relationship in which
wage earners generally (except for minor apprentices) retained complete legal autonomy during their employment. See generally R. Steinfeld, supra note 38.
54. 1 OFFICIAL REPORT OF THE DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE STATE CONVENTION,
ASSEMBLED MAY 4TH, 1853, at 550 (Boston 1853) [hereinafter DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS,

MASSACHUSE'rTS CONVENTION OF 1853] (address delivered by Henry Williams).
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Wood has noted, "most of the constitution-makers in the early years of
the Revolution assumed, although with increasing defensiveness, that
'sufficient discretion,' making a man 'afree agent in a politicalview,' was a
'55
prerequisite to the right to vote."
If most Americans believed that only the free and independent
should participate in self-government, they also continued to believe
that only property ownership conferred genuine independence on a
man. What is difficult to justify is separating political rights from economic status when both of these propositions are taken seriously. Together, these propositions point directly to the conclusion that political
rights must be based on property ownership. The propertyless, because they remain dependent on and subject to the government of men
who control resources, cannot be included among the truly self-governing. They will continue to be dependent on and subject to the government of the wealthy.
But the Revolution had also spawned ideas and generated movements which began to make the close identification of political rights
with property ownership deeply problematic. Almost as soon as the
Revolution broke out, groups of artisans and mechanics began to agitate for suffrage reform. 56 They claimed the maxim "[t]hat all men are
by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights"
for themselves. And under the banner of equality of right, they began
to insist that property owning qualifications betrayed the fundamental
precepts of the Revolution. But as they pressed for the separation of
political rights from property ownership, claiming that all men regardless of their status were entitled to these rights, not very many of them
would have denied that it was only property ownership which made a
man genuinely independent. How then could men who owned no
property legitimately claim the political privileges of the selfgoverning?
The debate over suffrage which was initiated during these years con55. G. WooD, supra note 15, at 169.
56. For accounts of this artisan agitation for suffrage reform during and following the
Revolution see E. FONER, supra note 11, at 123-28, 142-44; S. WILENrz, supra note 11, at 66;

H. RocK, supra note 11, at 49-51. See also G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 169. Needless to say,
support for suffrage reform came not only from the laboring sections of the population. By
1820,
The Niles' Register, a national spokesman for the manufacturing interest, [took the position] that property tests themselves led to an aristocracy while a personal-property
test or universal suffrage led to election frauds. Only a taxpaying qualification was
free of these undesirable accompaniments. A proper and just handling of the suffrage, it maintained, was the bulwark against social instability and radicalism.
C. WIL.mMso, supra note 5, at 187. And at least one large New York landowner supported
broadened suffrage on the ground that reform was a guarantee to governments of stability
and fidelity. See id. at 197.
On the other hand, the most insistent critics of extended suffrage were whigs: "In the
North American Review, the American Review, the American Quarterly Review, and other journals of

whig opinion, writers contemplated with regret the decline of virtue and principle in American political life since the eighteenth century." Id. at 287.
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tinued for decades. Its structure was relatively simple. Those who
sought to maintain property qualifications appealed to the traditional
view that property ownership was necessary for personal independence, and hence a prerequisite for political participation. Those who
wished to replace formal property owning qualifications with taxpaying
qualifications or manhood suffrage appealed to the proposition "that
all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain
'5 7
inherent rights."
But the suffrage reformers' task was not as straightforward as this
simple contrast of positions might at first suggest. They vigorously asserted that "by nature all men are equally free and independent." But
most of them did not dispute that only property ownership conferred
real independence on a man. And most also agreed that the dependent
should not be permitted to participate in the self-governing people,
even under a broadened suffrage. As a result, when they argued for a
broadened suffrage, reformers were faced with the task of reconciling
underlying beliefs which appeared flatly contradictory. In order to do
so, they had to offer a way of thinking about independence which did
not turn on property ownership, but which recognized the indisputable
fact that property ownership did bring power, and did confer a degree
of personal independence. The process of accommodating these contradictory basic beliefs is the story of how the struggle to extend the
suffrage produced a distinctively nineteenth century, hybrid republican-liberal regime of political rights.
D. The Suffrage Debate in Virginia and Massachusetts
The struggle over the suffrage which began during the Revolution
continued into the 1820s, '30s, '40s, and beyond. During these decades, numerous state constitutional conventions were called to consider and reconsider qualifications for the vote. 58 During this span of
time, the overwhelming majority of states replaced their property owning qualifications either with taxpaying qualifications (with or without
pauper exclusions), or with provisions for white manhood suffrage
(with pauper exclusions). Outside the new Western states, very few departed from these norms by establishing white manhood suffrage without a pauper exclusion. 59
57. On the use of arguments drawn from natural rights philosophy to justify franchise
extensions, see C. WILLTAMSON, supra note 5, at 168, 198.

58. Reports on these suffrage debates are available for many of the conventions held
during these decades, including those held in Virginia, Massachusetts, New Jersey, Delaware,
and New York. Of the latter, only New York did not explicitly adopt a pauper exclusion when
it broadened the franchise. In developing an account of the struggle over the suffrage, I rely
primarily here on the debates which took place in the Virginia (1829-1830) and Massachusetts
(1820) conventions, but also draw on debates from the Delaware (1831) and New Jersey
(1844) conventions. In all four of these states the disfranchisement of paupers was integral to
the process which broadened the suffrage.
59. State suffrage requirements in the first half of the nineteenth century can be divided
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The real issue driving the suffrage debates in this period was
whether propertyless wage earners and tenants of land would be permitted to vote. As one Massachusetts reformer observed during that
state's 1820 convention, "Who are [the men excluded by the property
qualification]? [T]he laboring parts of society? How long have they
been fettered? Forty years. Who achieved our independence? This
60
class of men. And shall we then disfranchise them? I hope not."
into four separate categories. A number of state constitutions both imposed taxpaying requirements for the vote, and explicitly excluded paupers from the franchise. States adopting
such provisions (and the dates of their adoption) included: New Hampshire, taxpaying qualification initially adopted by statute in 1775, pauper exclusion added to constitution in 1792,
see N.H. CONST. of 1784, pt. II, art. 28 (1792) (reprint ed., Concord 1850); Delaware, taxpaying qualification effective 1792, DEL. CONST. of 1792, art. IV, § 1, reprintedin 2 STATE CONSnTUTIONS, supra note 4, at 210, pauper exclusion effective 1831, DEL. CONST. of 1831, art. IV,
§ 1, reprintedin 2 STATE CoNsrrrtrrIoNs, supra note 4, at 222; Massachusetts, taxpaying qualification and pauper exclusion ratified simultaneously in 1822, MASS. CONST. of 1780, amend.
art. III (1822), reprintedin 5 STATE CoNsxrrtrrIoNs, supra note 4, at 109; Rhode Island, taxpaying qualification for native-born citizens, freehold qualification for naturalized citizens, and
pauper exclusion ratified simultaneously, R.I. CONST. of 1842, art. II, §§ 2, 4 reprinted in 8
STATE CoNsTrrTUnONS, supra note 4, at 388-89.

Other states adopted taxpaying qualifications but did not explicitly exclude paupers from
the suffrage. These states included: Pennsylvania, taxpaying qualification effective 1776,
PENN. CONST. of 1776, "Plan or Frame of Government," § 6, reprinted in 8 STATE CONsTrruTIONS, supra note 4, at 279, poorhouse exclusion adopted by judicial interpretation in 1877, see
note 2 supra;Georgia, taxpaying qualification effective 1789, GA. CONST. of 1789, art. IV, § I,
reprintedin 2 STATE CoNsTITUrIONS, supra note 4, at 454; Ohio, taxpaying qualification effective
1803, OHIO CONST. of 1802, art. IV, § 1, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTITrrONS, supra note 4, at
551; Connecticut, taxpaying qualification ratified 1818, CONN. CONsT. of 1818, art. VI, § 2,
reprinted in 2 STATE CoNsTrrTrONS, supra note 4, at 149; New York, taxpaying qualification
ratified 1822, N.Y. CONST. of 1822, art. II, § 1, reprinted in 7 STATE CONSTrITrIONS, supra note
4, at 183, manhood suffrage ratified 1826, residency exclusion for almshouse inmates ratified
1846, N.Y. CONST. of 1846, art II, § 3, reprintedin 7 STATE CONSTITUTIONS, supra note 4, at 194;
North Carolina, taxpaying qualification ratified 1854, N.C. CONST. of 1776, art. I, § 3, d. 2,
reprintedin 7 STATE CONSTrrUTIONS, supra note 4, at 411.
Still other states adopted white male suffrage along with pauper exclusions. These states
included: South Carolina, ratified 1810, S.C. CONST. of 1790, art. I, § 4 (1810), reprinted in 8
STATE CONSTrtrrIoNs, supra note 4, at 483; Maine, ratified 1819, ME. CONST. of 1819, art. II,
§ 1, reprintedin 4 STATE CONSTIrrTONS, supra note 4, at 316; Rhode Island's "People's Constitution," ratified 1841, R.I. "PEOPLE'S CONSTITUTION" of 1841, art. II, cls. 1, 2, reprinted in 8
STATE CONSTrrTTIONS, supra note 4, at 373; NewJersey, ratified 1844, N.J. CONST. of 1844, art.
II, § 1, reprintedin 6 STATE CONSTrrTUTIONS, supra note 4, at 454; Virginia, white male suffrage
ratified 1851, VA. CONST. of 1851, art. III, § 1, reprintedin 10 STATE CONsTrrtrnoNs, supra note
4, at 71-72, pauper exclusion ratified 1830, VA. CONST. of 1830, art. III, § 14, reprinted in 10
STATE CONSTUTIoNs, supra note 4, at 64.
Finally, a number of states adopted white male suffrage with no pauper exclusions.
These included: Vermont, affirmed by the legislature in 1779, VT. CONST. of 1777, ch. II, § 6,
reprintedin 9 STATE CONSTrrtrIONS, supra note 4, at 491; Kentucky, effective 1792, Ky. CONST.
of 1792, art. III, reprintedin 4 STATE CONSTrrtONs, supra note 4, at 146; Tennessee, effective
1796, TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. III, § 1, reprintedin 9 STATE CONSTrrITTIONS, supra note 4, at
144-45; Maryland, ratified 1810, MD. CONST. of 1776, amend, art. XIV (1810), reprintedin 4
STATE CONSTITUrTONS, supra note 4, at 387; Indiana, effective 1816, IND. CONST. of 1816, art.
VI, § 1, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTrrTrrIoNS, supra note 4, at 372; Illinois, effective 1818, ILL.
CONST. of 1818, art. II, § 27, reprinted in 3 STATE CONSTrrtIoNs, supra note 4, at 240; Michigan, ratified 1837, MICH. CONST. of 1835, art. II, § 1, reprintedin 5 STATE CONsTrrTrIONS, supra
note 4, at 205.
60. JOURNAL OF DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS IN THE CONVENTION OF DELEGATES CHOSEN
TO REVISE THE CONSTITUTION OF MASSACHUSETTS, BEGUN AND HOLDEN AT BOSTON, NOVEMBER

15, 1820, AND CONTINUED BY ADjOURNMENT TOJANUARY 9, 1821, at 252 (Boston 1853) [herein-
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In 1829, Virginia still required that voters own freehold land. Persons had to own twenty-five acres with a twelve-foot by twelve-foot
house, or unsettled land of fifty acres, to be qualified to vote.61 As was
the case with so many of the constitutional conventions called during
these post-Revolutionary decades, the suffrage quickly emerged as one
of the principal issues in the 1829-30 Virginia convention.
In October, suffrage reformers presented to the convention "The
Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond. ' ' 62 The
memorialists urged the adoption of a broader franchise. They began
their argument from the first principles of post-Revolutionary political
theory, including the idea that all power derived from the people, that
no man deserved special privileges, and that under the great compact
by which their polity was ordered, government and taxation required
popular consent. Foremost among these principles, they contended,
was the idea "[t]hat all men are by nature equally free and independent,
and have certain inherent rights .... "63 But the actual "regulation of
suffrage," they argued, in no way accorded with these principles:
A regulation, which, instead of the equality nature ordains, creates an
odious distinction between members of the same community; robs of
all share, in the enactment of the laws, a large portion of the citizens,
bound by them, and whose blood and treasure are pledged to maintain
them, and vests in a favoured class, not in consideration of their public
services, but of their private possessions, the highest of all privileges; one
which... is held practically to confer, absolute sovereignty. 64
But the Virginia reformers' appeals to abstract principles of natural
after DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION OF 1820] (remarks of Mr. Sloat 251-52 (remarks of Josiah Quincy).
cum of Dartmouth); see also id.
61. "Housekeepers" in Williamsburg and Norfolk could also vote "if they had served to
any trade for five years." See note 12 supra.
62.

PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES OF THE VIRGINIA STATE CONVENTION OF

1829-30,

TO

WHICH ARE SUBJOINED, THE NEw CONSTrruTION OF VIRGINIA AND THE VOTES OF THE PEOPLE 25
(Richmond 1830) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, VIRGINIA CONVENTION].

63. Id.at 26. The memorialists contended:
Among the doctrines inculcated in the great charter handed down to us, as a declaration of the rights pertaining to the good people of Virginia and their posterity, "as
the basis and foundation of Government," we are taught,
"That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and have certain inherent rights, of which, when they enter into a state of society, they cannot, by any
compact, deprive or divest their posterity ....
"That all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the people.
"That no man, nor set of men, are entitled to exclusive or separate emoluments
or privileges, but in consideration of public services.
"That all men, having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest with,
and attachment to, the community, have a right of suffrage, and cannot be taxed, or
deprived of their property, without their consent, or that of their representative, nor
bound by any law, to which they have not, in like manner, assented, for the public
good."
Id (from the Memorial of the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond, quoting the Virginia
Declaration of Rights of 1776).
64. Id (emphasis added).
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equality and freedom did not mean they were arguing for universal suffrage. They were not. And that left them open to the gibes of their
opponents. "[W]hy," defenders of the status quo taunted reformers,
"exclude any from the right of suffrage?... Why are not women, and
children, and paupers, admitted to the polls?" 6 5 Some reformers had

difficulty answering this question, suggesting only that "we are all
agreed" that women, children, paupers, and slaves were not entitled to
vote, and that it was inappropriate to test the principle of equality by
'6 6
such "extreme cases."
Other reformers, however, offered what they considered substantial
reasons for these exclusions. They argued that the abstract proposition
that "all men were by nature equally free and independent" did not
mean that all people were, in fact, independent. And in good republican fashion, they affirmed that they only wished to extend the privilege
of self-government to those who were independent. But their definition of independence was now quite different from the classic republican one. "[I]t is said," Mr. Cooke of Frederick declared,
that if it be true that "all men are by nature equally free," then all men,
all women, and all children, are.., entitled to the right of suffrage ....
Sir, no such absurdity can be inferred from the language of the Declaration of Rights. The framers of that instrument... did not express
the self-evident truth that the Creator of the Universe, to render woman more fit for the sphere in which He intended her to act, had made
her weak and timid, in comparison with man, and had thus placed her
under his control, as well as under his protection. That children, also,

from the immaturity of their bodies and their minds, were under a like
control. They did not say... that the exercise of political power, that
is to say, of the right of suffrage, necessarily impliesfree-agency and intelligence; free-agency because it consists in election or choice between different men and different measures; and intelligence, because on a judicious
choice depends the very safety and existence of the community. That
nature herself had therefore pronounced, on women and children, a
sentence of incapacity to exercise political power. They did not say all
this; and why? Because to the universal sense of all mankind, these
were self-evident truths. They meant, therefore, this, and no more:
that all members of a community, of mature reason, and free agents by
situation, are originally and by nature, equally entitled to the exercise of
65. I& at 68.
66. Id at 414. One reformer argued:
Mr. Chairman, it has been said ... that we derive a rule from the law of nature and
the Bill of Rights, in relation to suffrage, that is in its terms universal, and that we
ourselves abandon it, and thereby prove its fallacy: the females, including one half of
the population, are disfranchised at one fell swoop; minors, convicts, paupers, slaves,
For this
&c., which together, compose a large majority of every community ....
argument, I have a short answer; it will not do to test any rule by extreme cases. I
presume it cannot be necessary for me to assign a reason for the exceptions ...
[because, after all,] [i]n the foregoing exceptions we are all agreed.
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political power, or a voice in the Government. 67
This answer was particularly good because it reconciled several of
the most basic premises of the reformist position. On the one hand,
reformers said that the right to the suffrage "has its origin in every
human being ... it is inherent, and appertains to him in right of his
existence; his person is the title deed .... ,,68 On the other hand, they
proposed to continue excluding many from the suffrage. But they were
not free to argue, as the defenders of the property qualification were,
that social status or economic position disqualified these kinds of persons. It was, after all, the reformers' contention that the suffrage right
inhered "in every human being," that personhood "is the title deed."
A crucial part of their attack on the status quo had been that property ownership was a purely private matter, holding no significance for
legal and political rights.
The suffrage reformers instead justified the continued exclusion of
so many from the franchise on the basis of natural or individual incapacity. This preserved the idea that only the self-governing were entitled
to participate in politics, but it added a new twist. Dependence was no
longer associated with propertylessness, but dictated by nature and
character and embodied in legal relationshipsof dependence, like husband
and wife, parent and child, and pauper and town. The law of nature
guaranteed the suffrage to all, reformers urged, "unless it be those on
whom the same natural law has pronounced judgment of disability [i.e.,
women and children], or those who have forfeited it by crime or profligacy ....
It was precisely because of their perceived natural and
individual disabilities that women, children, and paupers continued to
be placed under the legal control of those who protected and provided
for them.
Those who defended property qualifications began their argument
from different premises. The "plain exposition of the origin and formation of society," they contended,
incontestibly shows that both Representation and Suffrage are social institutions. It proves that it is a solecism to insist, that it is proper to refer
back to a state of nature, for principles to regulate rights which never
existed in it-which could only exist after mankind abandoned it ....
[Ijn deciding upon suffrage, we are deciding a question of expediency and
policy, and . . . we ought so to regulate
it, as will best promote the
70
happiness and prosperity of society.
"

And only freeholders passed the policy test for reliable republican citizenship. Only the ownership of real property guaranteed that a person
had a sufficiently "permanent common interest" with the community to
67. Id at 55-56.
68. Id at 412.
69. Id
70. Id at 364 (emphasis added).
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be trusted with the right of election. 7 1
But according to defenders of the status quo, something equally important lay behind the freehold qualification. It kept those without
"wills of their own" from voting. In Virginia, defenders of the freehold
qualification argued, its elimination would mean the enfranchisement
of leaseholders and wage earners, men who by virtue of their economic
dependence were not their own rulers. "[T]emporary [leasehold] interests [in the soil] give a control to others, over the votes of the holder,
just as certainly, as that 'a control over a man's subsistence, is always a
control over his will.' "72
Proponents of property qualifications repeatedly made this kind of
argument in the conventions of the early nineteenth century. In the
1820 Massachusetts convention, for example, Josiah Quincy made an
eloquent plea for retention of property qualifications 73 in nearly identical terms. He was concerned that if wage earners were enfranchised,
they would become a dangerous source of corruption in a republican
polity. "The theory of our constitution," he declared, "is, that extreme
poverty-that is, pauperism-is inconsistent with independence. It
therefore assumes a qualification of a very low amount, which, according to its theory, is the lowest consistent with independence." 74 "At
the present day," Quincy went on to add, the property qualification is
probably worth very little .... But prospectively, it [is] of great consequence .... Everything indicates that the destinies of the country will

eventuate in the establishment of a great manufacturing interest in the
Commonwealth. There is nothing in the condition of our country, to
prevent manufacturers from being absolutely dependent upon their
employers, here as they are everywhere else. The whole body of every
manufacturing establishment, therefore, are dead votes, counted by the
71. Id. As a defender of the property qualification argued:
[S]ufficient evidence of common, permanent interest, is only to be found in a lasting
ownership of the soil of the country.
This kind of property is durable, it is indestructible; and the man who acquires,
or is the proprietor of it, connects his fate by the strongest of all ties, with the destiny
of the country. No other species of property has the same qualities, or affords the
same evidence. Personal property is fluctuating-it is frequently invisible, as well as
intangible-it can be removed, and can be enjoyed as well in one society as another.
What evidence of permanent interest and attachment, is afforded by the ownership
of horses, cattle, or slaves? Can it retard or impede the removal from the State, in
times of difficulty or danger impending over it?What security is the ownership of
Bank or other stocks, or in the funded debt? None. A man may transfer this kind of
property in a few moments, take his seat in the stage, or embark in the steamboat,
and be out of the State in one day, carrying with him all he possesses.
Id
72. Id. at 364-65.
73. In Massachusetts, unlike Virginia, ownership ofpersonal as well as real property qualified men to vote in the period before the state adopted a taxpaying qualification. See MASs.
CONST. of 1780, pt. II, ch. I, §§ 2 (art. II) and 3 (art. IV), reprintedin 5 STATE CONsTrrtrrxoNs,
supra note 4, at 98, 100.
74. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, MASSACHusErrs CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 60, at
251. Notice that Quincy does not use the term "pauper" here to refer to those in receipt of
public assistance, but to the very poor, those without either real or personal property.
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head, by their employer. Let the gentlemen from the country consider,
how it may affect their rights, liberties and properties, if in every county
of the Commonwealth there should arise, as in time there probably
will, one, two, or three manufacturing establishments, each sending, as
polls dependthe case may be, from one to eight hundred votes to the
75
ing on the will of one employer, one great capitalist.
Suffrage reformers offered several responses to the arguments
made by the defenders of property qualifications. The first drew on
ideas introduced by the Scottish Common Sense school. The reformers argued that one did not have to own land to feel deep attachment to
the community. "Virtue [and] intelligence," the non-freeholders of
Richmond insisted, "are not among the products of the soil."
Attachment to property, often a sordid sentiment, is not to be confounded with the sacred flame of patriotism. The love of country, like
that of parents and offspring, is engrafted in our nature. It exists in all
climates, among all classes, under every possible form of Government.
76
Riches oftener impair it than poverty. Who has it not is a monster.
The second argument was a sophisticated challenge to the basic
premises behind the identification of property ownership with personal
independence. If the true measure of individual autonomy was economic independence, the reformers pointed out, in a commercial society one would have to look to something more than property
ownership to determine whether people were truly independent.
Rather, one would have to examine their balance sheets. It was the
very essence of commercial society, after all, that all kinds of people
exercised economic leverage over other people, even over people who
owned property. If political rights depended on economic independence, then many people, including freeholders, would have to be disfranchised. "[T]he gentleman ... yesterday," one reformer argued,
objected to tenants being voters, because, said he, the landlord held
them by their very heart-strings; could distrain upon them, sell their
last cow, and even the cradle on which their infants reposed. If the
gentleman's argument be a good one, I think it will prove too much

[W]ill not the reasons assigned . . . for the exclusion of tenants,
operate in equal degree to exclude his own favorite freeholders? [W]ill
it not furnish a good reason for excluding every man that is indebted,
and for putting the Government in the hands of the creditor class of
the community? And if this be the rule of exclusion, how many of the
freeholders, think you, will be excluded? I venture to affirm at least
one half or three-fourths: is there not that proportion indebted to their
neighbours, their merchants, to the Banks, &c., by account, by bond,
and by trust deed, or otherwise; and will not a debt have the same influ75. Id. at 251-52. Similar concerns were expressed in Virginia. See PROCEEDINGS AND
DEBATES, VIRGINIA CONVENnON, supra note 62, at 28, 158-59.
76. PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, VIRGINIA CONVENTION, supra note 62, at 27 (Memorial of

the Non-Freeholders of the City of Richmond).
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ence upon a 'freeholder, as upon a tenant or other non-freeholders?
Indebtedness is, in substance, the reason assigned for excluding the
tenant; and can it be a matter of any importance what sort of debt it be,
whether it be for rent or any other consideration; whether it be collectable by distress-warrant, or by fieri facias, whether the cow or the cradle be sold by the constable, the sheriff, or a trustee or marshal, or
whether the person indebted be turned out of possession by notice, to
quit if a tenant, or7 7by a haberefacias possessionem, or sesinam if a mortgaged freeholder?
Thus, the reformers noted that in a commercial society, no clear
boundary between economic dependence and independence could be
drawn at the property line. Very few men were completely independent, and the economic position of most was neither absolute dependence nor independence, but some relative level of economic
vulnerability. In such a society, the reformers argued, the true measure
of independence should be whether a man "manage[d] ...his private
affairs." 7 8 In other words, the real question in separating the self-governing from the dependent should be whether a man had the legal right
79
to dispose of himself or whether that right of control lay in another.
77. Id. at 415-16.
78. Id. at 27. In 1829, this was not a new idea. Radicals had been arguing for decades
that he "who has a will and understandingof his own capable to manage his affairs" should be
entitled to vote. G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 231 (emphasis in original). The idea, of course,
goes back further still. During the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, the levellers had employed a similar distinction in arguing for their version of suffrage reform. See C.
B. MACPHERSON, supra note 51, at 142-54; see generally THE LEVELLER TRACTS, 1647-1653 (IV.
Haller & G. Davies eds., reprint. ed. 1964).
79. See PROCEEDINGS AND DEBATES, VIRGINIA CONVENTION, supra note 62, at 55-56. This

was actually only one form of the test proposed by suffrage reformers. The other distinguished those who would be entitled to vote from those who would not by asking whether
they had fulfilled their personal duties to the polity like taxpaying or militia service. One
Virginia reformer explained:
What I mean by General Suffrage, is the extension of that inestimable right of voting
...to all white freemen of the age of twenty-one years and upwards, who are citizens
by birth or residence for a certain time, and who have dischargedall the burthens personal
including militia duties, and pecuniary, such as taxes, imposed upon them by the laws of the land
....In other words, I wish to establish a qualification that is personal, and respects
age and residence, and to abolish forever the freehold qualification, which to me has
always appeared an invidious and anti-republican test.
Id. at 410 (emphasis added).
If the legal right of self-government stood as the direct rationale for pauper exclusions.
the fulfillment of personal political duties stood directly behind tax paying qualifications. We
might almost call the first kind of test a possessive individualist test and the second a republican test for wage earners. The deep connection between them in the minds of contemporaries, however, seems to have been that political capacity demanded that individuals command
resources at least sufficient for them to fulfill their various duties of support. Full members of
the polity should, on the one hand, fulfill their duty to maintain themselves and their dependents, their families. On the other hand, as members of the self-governing people, they
should fulfill their political duty to contribute to the maintenance of their government. Full
members of the polity should be sharing in the burdens of supporting it. Though the rationales differed, both tests generally functioned to enfranchise wage earners and to disfranchise
the destitute. This effect was intended. For what was critical to contemporaries in distinguishing between those with political capacity and those without was that the gainfully em-
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REDEFINING INDEPENDENCE BY DISFRANCHISING PAUPERS

The Creation of a New Test for Independence: Legal Self-Government

This new way of thinking about personal independence was plausible to many Americans in this period precisely because of the implicit
and familiar contrast between people who controlled themselves and
the many adults who still did not enjoy that right. In the relationships
of "legal dependence" still common in the early nineteenth century,
not only wives and children, but also paupers, lacked the right of legal
disposal of their own persons. They were not self-governing, in that
they were legally obligated to obey the reasonable commands of their
providers. In particular, they could not dispose of their energies according to their own desires; their labor was the property of their
providers.
In 1833, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court described the
legal relationship between towns and paupers this way:
Towns are bound by law to support, comfortably, all such of their inhabitants as may from time to time fall into distress and stand in need
of relief, and to continue such support so long as it may be needed; and
during its continuance they are entitled to the reasonable services of
those supported by them ....The rights and duties of towns and paupers are correlative. While the town supports the pauper, the pauper is
bound to labor for the town. But when the80support becomes unnecessary, the right to control the labor ceases.
As late as the 1880s, in some locales, paupers continued to be legally
bound to serve the town which was supporting them. In 1884, for example, Connecticut towns were still farming out their paupers and still
assigning the rights to their labor. In Groton, Connecticut, "the keeper
of the town poor" still operated "under a written contract, [by which
he] receiv[ed] an annual compensation for three years of $2,300, and
for an additional term of three years the annual sum of $2,800, and the
services of the paupers during both periods." 8 1
In contrast to these legally dependent persons, those who had the
legal right to control themselves, though they were otherwise propertyless, began to appear autonomous in a way which also made them appear qualified to participate in government. By this time, as we have
8 2
seen, wage earners were included among the legally autonomous.
They entered employment through "contracts," and were understood
to retain the legal control and disposal of their own persons under all
circumstances. 8 3 The employment relationship no longer took the
ployed among the propertyless had the capacity to fulfill their political and domestic duties of
support; paupers and the destitute did not.
80. Wilson v. Brooks, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 341, 343 (1833).
81. Fish v. Perkins, 52 Conn. 200, 201 (1884) (emphasis added).
82. See notes 53-54 supra and accompanying text.
83. Ida
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form of a legal relationship of dependence. Wage earners were no
longer legally analogous to wives, children, and paupers, but stood as
their binary opposites: wage earners legally autonomous; wives, children, and paupers legally dependent and bound.
In many of the states which broadened their suffrage in these years,
the legal right to self-government became a primary test for separating
those who were entitled to the franchise from those who would continue to be disfranchised. 84 In Delaware, the 1831 convention added a
pauper exclusion to the taxpaying qualification which had been in effect
since 1792. The committee which introduced the pauper clause explained to the convention that "[plaupers who live on the public funds,
and who were under the direction of others, who might control their wills, ought
' '8 5
not to be permitted to vote.
But this test of legal self-government was also applied in Delaware
to disfranchise members of the United States armed forces stationed
there, on the ground that "such persons were under the influence of
others, that they were bound to obey orders, that they were in a special
sense the servants of the U[nited] States, and as such disposed to gratify the wishes of the Executive of the United States." 8 6 Indeed, one
member of the convention wanted to carry the principle further. He
moved to add "servants" to the disfranchised category, arguing that
"[t]here were servants known to the laws, as persons convicted of
crimes and sold to discharge jail fees ... [who] were still citizens, and as
such might be taxed, and might vote, though under the control of
others." 87 But the convention ultimately rejected this proposal because, as one member observed, "it might exclude those who voluntarily
contracted to serve others,"8 8 and who were now commonly considered to be legally autonomous.
When New Jersey introduced white manhood suffrage in 1844, it
excluded paupers, idiots, and the insane from the franchise. In the
convention debates, members pointed to the absence of the legal right
to self-possession as the reason for excluding paupers. The drafters of
the pauper exclusion thought:
84. The other primary test required that voters fulfill their personal political duties toward the republic. See note 79 supra. For a comparison of the tests proposed in Germany at
the abortive constitutional convention of 1849, see Rose, The Issue of ParliamentarySuffrage at
the Frankfurt NationalAssembly, 5 CENT. EUR. HIsT. 127 (1972). Both the range of tests and the
ultimate outcome were remarkably similar to the earlier American experience. In the German
convention, liberals apparently opened by proposing an "independence" test defined to exclude "minors, bankrupts, servants, factory workers andjourneymen, farmhands, [and] poorrelief recipients." Id. at 132. Ultimately, however, the convention adopted a test which allowed all males who were twenty-five or older to vote except for "bankrupts, poor-relief recipients, and persons in the guardianship of others." Id. at 143.
85. DEBATES OF THE DELAWARE CONVENTION, FOR REVISING THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
STATE OR ADOPTING A NEW ONE; HELD AT DOVER, NOVEMBER, 1831, at 23 (1881) (emphasis

added).
86. Id. at 24.
87. Id. at 163.
88. Id at 164 (emphasis added).
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[W]hen a man is so bowed down with misfortune, as to become an inmate of a poor house .... he voluntarily surrenders his rights.... [I]t is
so considered in law. He parts with his liberty-he loses his control of
his children and he labors for others....
... Can we regard [paupers] as free agents? [A]s qualified to vote?
No, sir! No, sir!8 9

When the Maine Supreme Court was asked by Maine's House of
Representatives to render an opinion on the precise scope of that
state's pauper exclusion, the court provided a similar rationale. Noting
that disfranchisement was appropriate for those lacking "understanding, discretion or power of self-government," the court explained that
"paupers are excepted because they are dependent upon and under the
care and protection of others, and necessarily feel that they cannot exercise their judgment or express their opinions with any
independence." 90
This understanding of independence played an important role not
only in states which adopted pauper exclusions, but also in states which
were adopting taxpaying qualifications. In these states, contemporaries
well understood, the practical result of taxpaying qualifications was to
enfranchise the self-supporting wage earner and to disfranchise the
destitute. "When a government extends the right of suffrage to all persons... who have paid.., a [poll] tax," one Massachusetts man wrote,
"it practically gives the right to everybody not a pauper; for, among the
able-bodied poor, and among all who maintain themselves by labor of
all descriptions, there are very few persons indeed who cannot pay...
seventy-five cents in a year .... "91
89. NEWJERSEY WRITERS' PROJECT OF THE WORKS PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEwJERSEY STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1844, at 88-89 (1942) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS, NEW JERSEY CONVENTION OF 1844]. In words reminiscent of those
Josiah Quincy had used twenty years before in Massachusetts to explain why employees in
large factories should not be permitted to vote, see text accompanying note 75 supra, one
delegate drew a vivid picture of the dangers involved in permitting paupers to vote. "How
humiliating a sight would it be, sir," he argued, "to see a band of these paupers led up to the
ballot box, and deposit their votes by the tricks of their master!" PROCEEDINGS, NEW JERSEY
CONVENTION OF 1844, supra, at 88. Others at the convention did try to argue that the proposed pauper exclusion was inconsistent with the principle that there should be no pecuniary
qualifications for the vote. Id. at 89-90, 429-32. But this argument failed to carry the convention. Id. at 584.
90. 7 Me. 497, 498 (1831) (advisory opinion).
91. DISCUSSIONS ON THE CoNsTrrrUoN PROPOSED TO THE PEOPLE OF MASSACHUSETrS BY
THE CONVENTION OF 1853, at 54-55 (Boston 1854) [hereinafter DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROPOSED
MASSACHUSETTS CONVENTION] (letter by G.T. Curtis). The view that only those who shared in
the burdens of maintaining the republic should be entitled to vote, that taxation and representation should go hand in hand, see note 79 supra, was repeated over and over again in the
conventions which adopted taxpaying qualifications. The new conception of independence
nevertheless played an important role in their adoption, even where they were not accompanied by formal pauper exclusions. The general effect of taxpaying qualifications in states
which had a poll tax, as contemporaries well understood, was to enfranchise the self-supporting wage earner while disfranchising the destitute, as pauper exclusions also tended to do.

364
B.

STANFORD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:335

Wage Earningas a Standard of Independence

As reformers won in more and more states, expanding the suffrage
and bringing more working men into the political process, the idea of
legal self-government as a way of understanding independence and dependence, and of allocating political rights, began to supplant the very
different classical republican understanding of personal independence.
In this new Jacksonian world of the nineteenth century, the crucial distinction between the independent and the dependent began to turn on
whether a man legally disposed of his own labor, and supported himself
and his dependents, or whether he was forced into dependence on
poor relief. As one reformer in the 1820 Massachusetts convention said
of "laboring men": "[T]hey have no freehold-no property to the
amount of two hundred dollars, but they support their families reputa92
bly with their daily earnings."
Increasingly, in American political and legal culture, the test for
separating the self-governing from the dependent was becoming
whether a person supported himself by earning wages or was dependent on poor relief. And it was applied to draw a bright line between
the independent and the dependent even under highly ambiguous circumstances. In 1877, for insfance, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
employed just this kind of test to decide who might legitimately be
omitted from voting lists under the new Constitution of 1873. 9 3 Em-

ployees of almshouses, the court explained, were not paupers (and thus
were entitled to vote), even if they once had been paupers, because
they "are now in good faith employed at wages, even though small, and
*

.

. clothe themselves, and are at liberty to leave their places at their

Though the formal rationales for the two kinds of clauses differed, both expressed a changed
attitude toward the political capacity of wage earners.
Most states which adopted taxpaying qualifications had some form of poll or capitation
tax. Hence, in such states "[w]ith taxation of adult males almost universal, a taxpaying suffrage was almost universal suffrage." C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 136. For a list of states
which had some form of capitation tax during this period, see H. ADAMS, TAXATION IN TilE
UNITED STATES, 1789-1816, at 314 (1884). For those where capitation taxes were combined
with a taxpaying qualification, see C. WILLIAMSON, supra note 5, at 136, 181, 194. In states
which did not have a poll tax, on the other hand, where only personal or real property was
taxed, the taxpaying qualification could amount to a property test. Id at 271.
Nevertheless, some states did add pauper exclusions to taxpaying qualifications. One
reason may simply have been that the two kinds of exclusions rested on separate rationales.
See, for example, the discussion of the two kinds of exclusions by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 538 (1832) (advisory opinion). But there were probably
practical considerations as well. The coverage of the two exclusions could be different. Taxpaying clauses were both narrower and broader. Many stated that one could vote if one had
paid a tax within the prior one or two years. Under these clauses, it was possible for someone
to be eligible to vote even if they were currently receiving poor relief, if they had paid a tax
within the requisite period. But tax clauses could also have broader coverage. They tended
to disfranchise people who would not have been disfranchised under pauper clauses. Not
only most recipients of poor relief, but the destitute generally, those who were excused from
paying taxes, were frequently disfranchised under the tax clauses.
92. DEBATES AND PROCEEDINGS, MASSACHUSET'S CONVENTION OF 1820, supra note 60, at
252 (remarks of Mr. Austin of Boston).
93. Murray's Petition, 5 Weekly Notes of Cases 9 (Pa. 1878).
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own free will .... ,,94 In contrast, the court excluded from the suffrage
former paupers who received no wages, but who worked in an almshouse for room and board: "We think it is more in accordance with the
language and spirit of the Constitution to treat such persons as still in
the class of paupers. They are not free and self-supporting citizens,
and are therefore deprived, for the time, of their political privilege of
voting."9 5
As early as 1833, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court had
similarly made the ability to maintain oneself by selling one's labor for
wages the test for determining whether a person was legally independent. In deciding the case of one individual, a man of "small mental
capacity," the court stated:
[H]e had bodily health and strength; could perform many kinds of labor on a farm; and was able to earn more than enough to support himself. He was willing to labor for the defendant, and the defendant was
willing to employ and to pay him wages
....
Can such a person be
96
considered a pauper? We think not.

By mid-century, it seemed, this identification of political capacity with
the ability to sell one's labor had become even more firmly established.
Increasingly, contemporaries answered the question why paupers
should be excluded from voting by explaining that "a man who cannot
maintain himself by his labor.., has not the mental and moral
qualifi97
cations which make him a fit depositary of political power."
In this new world, independent wage earner and dependent pauper
emerged together and created one another. The dependence of the
pauper defined by contrast what made the wage earner self-governing
even though he owned no property. At the same time, the contrast
between "independent wage earner" and "dependent pauper" began
to play a role in shaping the way working men experienced their own
lives. By the 1840s, activists in the labor movement were concerned
94. Id at 9.
95. Id
96. Wilson v. Brooks, 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 341, 343-44 (1833).
97. DISCUSSIONS ON THE PROPOSED MASSACHUSETrS CONVENTION, supra note 92, at 56
(letter by G.T. Curtis). A similar process occurred in England. Gertrude Himmelfarb writes
that the English Poor Law of 1832 was part of a new cultural universe structured very differently from the old. "The [old] Elizabethan laws were, in fact, genuinely and unambiguously
'poor' laws precisely because they did not make any sharp distinction between poor and pauper." G. HIMMELFARB, THE IDEA OF POVERTY: ENGLAND IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL AGE 160
(1984). By the 1830s, in contrast,
the marketplace recognized ... only... "contracts"--contracts freely entered into
by free men, by "independent laborers" and (it went without saying) independent
employers. In that contractual world the pauper had no part. He might be taken
care of, indeed the New Poor Law made elaborate arrangements to take care of him,
but it did so outside ihe framework of the market. Since that framework defined the
boundaries of society, the pauper was, by definition so to speak, an outcast-an outcast not so much by virtue of his character, actions, or misfortunes, but by the mere
fact of his dependency, his reliance on relief rather than his own labor for his
subsistence.
Id at 183.
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that pauperism was on the increase, 98 and working men began to worry
about winding up in the poorhouse. "To end one's years at the Alms
House among paupers and criminals," Paul Faler writes, "was a fear
that haunted many mechanics .... 99 Through their efforts to bring
about fundamental transformations in the terms of the franchise, and in
the traditional conception of the employment relationship, working
men themselves were partly responsible for the creation of this new
distinction. 10 0 As these changes penetrated social life, the definition of
freedom as self-ownership, and the contrast between "independent
wage earner" and "dependent pauper," became more than an abstract
proposition. White wage earners might find it difficult to imagine
themselves in the position of black slaves, 1° 1 but they had little difficulty imagining themselves falling into pauperism. As dependent paupers they could be institutionalized, let out to contractors of the poor
for their labor, or compelled to perform labor for a town. With the
spectre of the poorhouse hanging over them, the legal freedom to come
and go as they wished, to sell their labor to whomever they desired, and
to be legally obligated to obey no man's commands, could very well be10 2
gin to feel like genuine freedom.
C. The Problem of Propertylessnessand the Self-Governing Wage Earner
These developments did not mean that wage earners had stopped
98. "'Thirty years ago,'" one labor leader observed, "'the number of paupers in the
whole United States was estimated at 29,166, or one in three hundred. The pauperism of
New York City now amounts to 51, 600, or one in every seven of the population.'" N. WARE,
THE INDUSTRIAL WORKER, 1840-1860: THE REACTION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY TO
THE ADVANCE OF THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION 27 (1924) (quoting G.H. Evans, in The Working

Man's Advocate, July 6, 1844). On the constant and pervasive economic vulnerability even of
skilled journeymen, see S. WiLENTz, supra note 11, at 50-51.
99. P. FALER, MECHANICS AND MANUFACTURERS IN THE EARLY INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION:
LYNN, MASSACHUSETTS, 1780-1860, at 173 (1981).
100. For a discussion of the impact which the Revolution had on the traditional master/
servant relationship, see R. Steinfeld, supra note 38. See also S. WILENTZ, supra note 11, at 23103 (discussion of the changes in the relationship between journeymen and their masters
occurring in the decades following the Revolution).
101. Recently, certain historians of labor have portrayed pre-Civil War abolitionists as
propagators of an emergent ideology of possessive individualism. They have accused abolitionists of pressing the novel view that freedom was a matter of self-ownership. Eric Foner,
for example, has noted that "[William Lloyd] Garrison, defending capitalist labor relations,
viewed the ability to contract for wages as a mark of liberty ...." E. FONER, POLITICS AND
IDEOLOGY IN THE AGE OF THE CIVIL WAR 71 (1980).

Our account of suffrage reform in the early decades of the nineteenth century suggests,
on the contrary, that this definition of freedom was not limited to a small band ofabolitionists.
Over a long period of time, it was being built into the very foundations of American legal and
political culture.
102. Jonathan Prude has shown how the freedom to come and go was used by Massachusetts mill workers in the 1820s and 1830s to maintain a modicum of independence. "Indeed,
among workers who rarely voted and whose other forms of resistance had only limited effect,
mobility may well have emerged as the principal means of avoiding 'corrupt' dependency on
their employers--of asserting independence." J. PRUDE, supra note 41, at 148. For a general
discussion of this point, see id. at 144-57. On the bargaining power which mobility gave tenants and wage laborers, see S. INNES, supra note 32, at 39.
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believing that only property ownership made men truly independent,
or that property conferred power. On the contrary, increasingly they
denounced their employment as wage slavery. 10 3 What these developments meant, rather, was that American culture and experience now
embraced two contradictory versions of the independence/dependence
distinction. One drew the line at property ownership, the other at selfownership. In a sense, the two versions had long played roles in AngloAmerican culture, but now their positions were reversed. 10 4 The one,
based on property ownership, which had previously been "established," was being disestablished. The other, based on self-ownership,
was being established in its place.
Increasingly, political rights were being linked, even if sometimes
indirectly, to self-ownership rather than to property ownership. Property ownership, in turn, was relegated to the realm of the "private."
Property might confer independence and give power, but that was only
a matter of private relationships between individuals in civil society.
The power of property to govern was being disestablished, and by virtue of disestablishment became more difficult to see and attack. In the
official realm, the realm of legal and political rights, less and less turned
on property ownership. Legal autonomy and the political right of selfgovernment were beginning to be guaranteed to virtually all men who
could support themselves by their own labor.
When working men began to press for the abolition of property
qualifications for the vote on the ground that they were independent,
self-governing individuals, even though they owned no property, their
agitations contributed to splitting the traditional universe into distinct
realms. In the new universe which their agitations helped to bring into
being, property ownership would be formally divorced from governance. Governance was to occupy one realm, the public realm; property
ownership was to be consigned to another, the realm of purely private
relationships between juridical equals. Consigned to the realm of the
private, the power over persons which property conferred lost its quality as "government" and became mere "private economic power."
In a world split apart in this way, the contradictory propositions that
all men were entitled to govern themselves, but that propertylessness
meant dependence and subjection, could both be accommodated. In
the first instance, this accommodation was managed by consigning each
version of the independence/dependence distinction to its own realm.
The independent wage earner/dependent pauper distinction began to
apply primarily to the public realm, the realm of legal and political
rights. In this realm, all capable men were indeed beginning to exercise
the rights of self-government. The truth that propertylessness meant
103. See D. MONTGOMERY, BEYOND EQUALITY: LABOR AND THE RADICAL REPUBLICANS,

1862-1872, at 30 (1967); see also N. WARE, supra note 98, at xv-xvi.
104. See note 78 supra for the historical roots of the view that the suffrage should be
expanded to those who had the legal right of self-government.
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dependence and subjection was beginning to be a truth limited to the
realm of private relationships.
But the structure of mediation in this new universe was even more
complex and multi-layered. 10 5 The independent wage earner/dependent pauper distinction itself played a direct role in mediating the contradictory premises of political culture. The new distinction radically
narrowed the idea of dependence. Dependence became "legal dependence." Paupers, wives, and children were thus dependent, but wage
earners, by this time, were not.
In this new world, propertylessness in itself made no one dependent. The propertyless who supported themselves by selling their labor were in all legal and political senses their own masters. They had
merely contracted with their employers to perform labor, and were as
free to leave as they had been to enter such relationships. The propertyless only became dependent by accepting poor relief and assuming
the legal status of pauper. As the Maine Supreme Court observed in
1831:
Property is not one of the necessary qualifications [for the vote in the
state of Maine].... Paupers, then, are not excepted merely on account
of their poverty. There must have been some other reason for their
exclusion from the class of qualified voters ....[P]aupers are excepted
because they are dependent upon and under the care and protection of
others ....106
Only dependent paupers were governed. But even they were not subject to the personal government of other men. By this time, paupers were
10 7
considered wards of the "public."
But while this conceptual universe divorced dependence from
propertylessness, it simultaneously acknowledged the intimate connection between the two, as indeed it had to, if it was to serve as a plausible
depiction of social and political life. It reaffirmed the unarguable truth
that property and independence were connected. But it did so by projecting this truth through the prism of a narrowed legal understanding
105. In addition to the ones we discuss, several other mediating devices emerged to deal
with this problem. Perhaps the earliest was the Jeffersonian image of a yeoman republic that
resolved the dilemma mainly by ignoring the propertyless. This image characterized the nation as one composed overwhelmingly of small, independent freeholders. When propertyless
wage earners became too important in the life of the nation to ignore, equality of opportunity
began to gradually supplant the image of the yeoman republic. See D. MONTGOMERY, supra
note 103, at 30-32. According to this view, capable men might begin their lives as propertyless apprentices or hirelings, but almost everyone had the opportunity to acquire property
and ultimately to become his own master.
106. 7 Me. 497, 498 (1831) (advisory opinion).
107. During both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, paupers were primarily the
responsibility of towns and parishes. But the basic status of towns changed in fundamental
ways during that time. Where previously towns had been understood to be mixed public/
private bodies, by the third decade of the nineteenth century they had been redefined as
purely public and governmental. See Frug, The City As a Legal Concept, 93 HARV L. REV. 1057,
1099-1105 (1980); see also H. HARTOG, PUBLIC PROPERTY AND PRIVATE PowER: THE CORPORATrION OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK IN AMERICAN LAW,

1730-1870, at 191-204 (1983).
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of dependence. The propertyless were dependent only insofar as they
were so utterly destitute that they had to accept public assistance. Only
paupers were genuinely propertyless; they had been deprived of even the
property in their own labor. The rest of the propertyless were independent, self-supporting citizens precisely because they possessed
valuable property in their own labor. In the contractual realm of civil
society, wage earners dealt with the propertied as full juridical equals.
Recast in this way, the indisputable truth that property ownership
was necessary for self-government began to appear compatible with the
proposition that all men were entitled to govern themselves. The dangerous truth that propertylessness involved subjection to other men
had been partially neutralized. The utterly destitute segment of the
propertyless, the genuinely dependent, were, by definition, those who
had failed even to enter into contractual relationships with the propertied. Their destitution placed them entirely outside the boundaries of
civil society, as wards of the public. In this form, the politically charged
connection between propertylessness and subjection could be carried
forward more safely. There was no possibility, however, in a universe
in which all capable men were thought to be entitled to govern themselves, that the problem of property ownership could be permanently
laid to rest. It was and would remain one of the most basic and intractable problems in American political culture.108
As the nineteenth century wore on, wage earners vigorously insisted
that the power of property made them slaves to their employers. They
could appeal to deeply entrenched republican beliefs to support their
claims, but their argument was now more difficult and more contradictory. For decades wage-earners had argued that they merited the vote
precisely because they were among the self-governing, and that they
were among the self-governing because they owned and disposed of
themselves. Their propertylessness, they had contended, made no difference. Having prevailed in that contention, having won the franchise,
and having gained legal autonomy in the employment relationship, it
became paradoxically difficult for wage-earners to argue that their
propertylessness subjected them to the rule of other men. 10 9
108. For an excellent discussion of this problem during the Civil War era, see generally
D. MONTGOMERY, supra note 103.

109. Needless to say, this universe was not created unilaterally by laboring men. Rather,
it was the product of a complex process which had seen laboring people achieve some of their
transformative political-legal and social objectives, but fail completely to achieve others. During the Revolution, for example, radical artisans in Pennsylania had agitated for the adoption
of so-called agrarian laws. These laws would have limited the amount of property any one
individual could legally accumulate. And such legislation did find support in aspects of classical whig thought. Had agrarian laws achieved wide acceptance after the Revolution, the universe of the nineteenth century might have looked quite different. In a more egalitarian
republic, independence and property ownership might have continued to be linked. On the
demand for agrarian laws in the period of the Revolution, see Nash, Smith & Hoerder, Labor
in the Era of the American Revolution: An Exchange, 24 LABOR HIsT. 414, 430-32 (1983). See also
G. WOOD, supra note 15, at 89.
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Throughout much of the nineteenth century, labor had to contend
with this basic contradiction. Equally important, working men had to
contend with a parallel, contradictory sense of freedom and unfreedom
in their own lives. They celebrated their independence, and considered
themselves free and self-governing men, even though they owned no
property; and yet they also experienced their propertylessness as wage
slavery. As a consequence of the "disestablishment" of property, labor
found itself in the unenviable position of having to argue and live out
these contradictory propositions. Together with the greater difficulty
involved in "seeing" the disestablished power of property, labor's contradictory experience operated simultaneously to reinforce and bring
into question the assumptions upon which the nineteenth-century social universe increasingly rested. The position of labor subtly legitimated the existing order even as it stood as testimony to its utter falsity.
VI.

THE PROBLEM OF KEEPING INDEPENDENT WAGE EARNERS AND
DEPENDENT PAUPERS CATEGORICALLY DISTINCT

The new social and legal construction of the world required a very
delicate balance between the most basic competing principles of American political culture. But the boundary on which this balance depended
was not completely stable. The realities of cyclical and seasonal unemployment, and of poor relief, made it very difficult to keep the two categories of the propertyless-independent wage earners and dependent
paupers-sealed tightly in separate compartments. The tendency of
the bright line to blur posed the danger that a universe constructed by
the opposition of independent wage earner and dependent pauper
might collapse back into a world of the undifferentiated propertyless
and the propertied.' 1 0
In 1831, Maine's House of Representatives asked the Maine
Supreme Court to render an advisory opinion on the state's pauper disfranchisement clause. The Representatives wanted to know "what
length of time after receiving [assistance under the poor law] is necessary to restore [a pauper] to the privileges of an elector?""' The
Court answered without hesitation. "[A] man," it declared, "is to be
supplies, as such, from the
considered a pauper so long as he receives
12
town where he resides, but no longer.""
A pair of Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court opinions from this
period reveal just why it was considered so important to restrict the
110. On this style of organizing the political-legal universe into vacuum-bounded binary
opposites, see Katz, Studies in Boundary Theory: Three Essays in Adjudication and Politics, 28 BUFFALO L. REV. 383 (1979).
111. 7 Me. 497, 497 (1831) (advisory opinion).
112. Id, at 499. But, employing some questionable reasoning, the court went on to add
that since one had to have resided in a town for at least three months prior to an election in
order to qualify to vote, one could not have received assistance during the three-month period directly preceding an election. Id. at 499-500.
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term "pauper" to "actual" recipients of poor relief, and why simultaneously it proved so difficult to do so. In the first opinion, rendered in
1832 to the State Senate, the court declared that persons who had been
exempted from taxation under the tax statutes by reason of age, infir13
mity, or poverty were not "paupers" for purposes of the franchise.'
Although admitting that in "a certain loose and indefinite sense, the
persons in question may be called paupers," the court ruled that under
the constitutional provisions dealing with suffrage, "the word 'paupers,'
had acquired a precise and technical meaning, and was understood to
designate [only] persons receiving aid and assistance from the public,
under the provisions made by law for the support and maintenance of
the poor .... "114
The danger in reading the term "pauper" broadly was obvious to
the court. A broader reading might result in the disfranchisement as
paupers of other poor persons, perhaps even of self-supporting though
propertyless wage earners. "[I]f [the term] were intended to be understood.., as extending to all poor persons, it might go to exclude those
from voting, whose poverty might be manifested in other modes than
[that they have been excused from paying taxes] ... ,i115

But twenty

years later, in another context, the same court was forced to adopt virtually the same broad definition of "pauper"-as-poor-person which it
had previously rejected. In Hutchings v. Thompson, 1 6 a grandparent refused to pay for the maintenance of his grandchildren, under a statute
making kindred financially responsible for their "pauper" relatives. He
argued that since the grandchildren had not actually received poor relief, they were not "paupers" within the scope of the statute. 117 The
113. 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 538, 540 (1832) (advisory opinion).
114. Id. At the same time, the Massachusetts court did not seem nearly so concerned
with reading the taxpaying clause narrowly. In a series of opinions, the court read that clause
to exclude from the franchise many who arguably should have been included. In this period,
tax statutes commonly permitted assessors to exempt from the tax lists those who "through
age, infirmity or poverty, may be unable to contribute." Id at 538. But the court concluded
that those exempted by age, infirmity, or poverty did not fall within the constitution's "by law
exempted" exception to the taxpaying requirement. Id. at 540-42. In an advisory opinion
delivered in 1844, the court went even further. It noted that if the legislature repealed the
poll tax, leaving only property taxes, then people would have to own property in order to
qualify to vote. See 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 591, 595 (1844) (advisory opinion).
It's a little hard to understand why the pauper and tax-paying clauses should have received such different treatment. It may have been that taxpaying was a sufficiently definite
test, and that there was little chance of the poll tax being repealed. As a result, the court
could feel easy about insisting on the strict application of the republican principle that voters
(with only a few exceptions) must always contribute to the maintenance of government, that
taxation and representation should, to the maximum extent possible, go hand in hand. In any
case, the practical effect of this strict reading was to reinforce the line between the destitute
(those exempted from taxation) and the self-supporting wage earner (those whose polls were
taken).
115. 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) at 540.
116. 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 238, 239 (1852).
117.
[R]espondent denies his liability on the alleged ground that the word "pauper" in
[the statute], is used technically, and means only a person who has received relief and
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court admitted that "[t]o construe the word 'pauper' in its narrow,
technical sense, in these sections, would be manifestly absurd."' 18 The
realities of poverty and poor relief compelled the court in this case to
read the term "pauper" broadly. Here "pauper" was to mean any
"poor and indigent" person, not merely "recipients of poor relief."' 19
These technical, definitional controversies all raised a deeper problem. Could "paupers" and "propertyless poor persons" be maintained
as clearly separate legal categories? In Massachusetts this deeper question rose to the surface and produced an important political controversy in the 1870s. In 1877, the Massachusetts legislature nearly
enacted a statute, which would have disfranchised all those who had
received poor relief during the prior year. At the last moment, questions about the bill's constitutionality forced it back into committee. 120
In its very next session, however, the legislature was considering a
similar bill when a prominent lawyer, Charles T. Russell, Jr., launched a
campaign against it. He published a pamphlet in which he argued that
the proposed legislation was unconstitutional. "[I]f the Legislature,"
he contended, "can say that the word 'pauper,' as used in the Constitution, shall mean 'a person who has within a year received public assistance,' it can say that the word shall mean 'a person worth less than
$500 or $200,' and so in effect restore the abolished property qualification for voters!" 1 2 1 Citing, among others, the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court's 1832 advisory opinion to the state Senate, Russell
maintained that the law of Massachusetts was already clear on the
subject:
If a person is receiving public assistance at the time he offers to vote,
he is disqualified; if he is not receiving public assistance at that time, if
otherwise qualified, he can vote; and no inquiry into his past poverty or
dependence, no search among the records of the overseers of the poor,
however authorized or required by statute, can deprive him of his constitutional right. 122
support from a town, under the provisions of the [poor law]. And he relies on the
opinion of the court ... that the amendment of the constitution, which prohibits
paupers from voting in certain elections, does not apply to all poor persons who
receive or need relief, but only to persons receiving aid and assistance from the
public.
IM at 239.
118. Id at 240.
119. Id at 241.
mhe words "such pauper," when applied to a person whom a town has relieved,
means a technical pauper... because, by being relieved by a town, he becomes a
technical pauper. The same words, however, when applied to one whom his kindred
have relieved, do not necessarily so mean. As has been already said, they mean one
of the poor and indigent persons mentioned in [the poor law], whether he be a technical pauper or not.
Id
120. For the legislative history of the bill, see C. RUSSELL, THE DISFRANCHISEMENT
PAUPERS: EXAMINATION OF THE LAW OF MASSACHUSEITS 3-4 (1878).
121. Id at 13.
122. Id at 24.

OF
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Russell clearly understood what was at stake in this proposed legislation. If it went into effect it would blur the sharp legal boundary separating wage earners, who might have been unemployed at some point
during the year, from paupers. "During the last few years," he began
his pamphlet, "owing to the depression in business and 'hard times,'
thousands of persons have been thrown out of employment, and be123
come more or less dependent upon public and private charity."'
Russell attacked what he saw as the "popular delusion" behind the proposal: namely, "'once a pauper always a pauper.' "124 Russell argued
that a pauper's dependence, and with it the justification for his exclusion from the suffrage, ended immediately after he stopped receiving
public assistance. 125 "Can it be pretended," Russell asked,
that, after the [town's] support became unnecessary, the town could
any more deprive [a former pauper] of his right to vote, than of his
right to labor for whom he pleased? Did not his right of suffrage
[along with his right to sell his labor to whom he pleased], suspended
during his dependence
upon the town, immediately revive and exist when
12 6
the dependence ceased?

Concerned by the questions raised about the bill's constitutionality,
the Massachusetts House, in April 1878, submitted the issue to the
Supreme Judicial Court. The court adopted Russell's interpretation of
the clause and a good deal of his reasoning as well. Citing its own 1833
opinion in Wilson v. Brooks, 127 the court ruled: "[A] man who has been
supported by his town as a pauper, but is able to earn more than
enough to support himself and has found an employer, and is therefore
not actually chargeable to the town and stands in no need of immediate
relief, is no longer a pauper."' 128 For the Massachusetts court that
ended the inquiry; the constitution disfranchised paupers only so long
as they were in actual receipt of assistance, and no longer.
Given the economic realities of the nineteenth century labor market,
it was apparent that men regularly passed back and forth over the
boundary separating the independent wage earner from the dependent
pauper. But in thepublicrealm of rights, it had become crucial by this time

that the independent wage earner and the dependent pauper not be
treated merely as two manifestations of a single group, the propertyless. A considerable intellectual effort was mounted in the face of pop123. Ideat 3.
124. Id at 29.
125. See idat 25.
126. Id at 26. Russell further pointed out the case of the individual who:
has been himself temporarily sick or out of work, and so required public aid for a
time; and afterwards recovers his health, or receives employment, and becomes again
self-supporting .... [Clan it be maintained that, after the dependence upon the
public ceases, the disqualifications imposed by the Constitution on account of such
dependence still continue?
Id at 26-27.
127. 31 Mass. (14 Pick.) 341 (1833).
128. 124 Mass. 596, 597 (1878) (advisory opinion).
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ular misconceptions to maintain the sharp legal boundary which defined
the two as opposites of one another. The boundary, contemporaries
now had to acknowledge, was readily crossed, but on each crossing the
individual was transformed into his juridical opposite. On crossing the
boundary in one direction, the individual's independence, his political
and legal right of self-government, "immediately revived" and his "dependence ceased." In the other direction, he instantly became a ward
of the state, with no legally or politically effective will of his own. This
vacuum boundary had become critical in maintaining a world in which
the propertied and propertyless-one governing, one governedwould not directly face each other. In Massachusetts, as elsewhere, this
sharp legal boundary endured well into the twentieth century.
VII.

CONCLUSION

[I]f it should ever happen, even once, that any one of the ideas that
motivate our life were taken seriously-uncompromisingly seriously, so
that nothing were left of the counter-idea-our civilisation could
scarcely continue to be the sort of civilisation it is!
-Robert

129
Musil, The Man Without Qualities

The pauper exclusions of the nineteenth century have been, for the
most part, invisible to historians. That they have been invisible is testimony to the prejudice among historians that historical periods function
more or less as rational and coherent wholes and are primarily guided
by one or a few consistent principles. This prejudice in itself is relatively new. It appeared in its modern form for the first time only in the
eighteenth century, when
Vico, Voltaire, Montesquieu, Millar, Schlozer... were able, each in his'
way, to observe that in a period supposedly governed by certain characteristics it was natural that certain social institutions, certain habits of
thought and forms of art should exist in conformity with the dominant
characteristics, and that they should fall and be replaced by others as
the character of the period changed. 130
Pauper exclusions have been overlooked because they seem inconsistent with the idea that "all men are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inherent rights," and because this idea is
supposed to have guided the movement to broaden the suffrage in the
decades following the American Revolution. This article has proceeded
from a different set of premises. It has worked from the idea that pauper exclusions were as integral to the period as was a broadened suffrage, and has accepted that a period may be governed by deeply
inconsistent principles. It has developed an account which reveals that
129. 2 R. MUSIL, THE MAN WrIouT QUALITIES 269 (E. Wilkins & E. Kaiser trans. 1967).
130. J. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAw: A STUDY OF ENGLISH
HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 248
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early nineteenth century suffrage reforms grew out of, and continued to
rest on, a complex and contradictory set of motivating ideas.
As laboring men mounted their struggle to alter the traditional
terms of political participation in the decades following the Revolution,
they did appeal to the view that "all men are by nature equally free and
independent." But most of them also continued to believe that only
the self-governing should exercise the suffrage and that only property
ownership conferred genuine independence. Out of the struggle over
the suffrage which drew on these contradictory materials came an ad
hoc, distinctively nineteenth century settlement. It incorporated versions of all these basic ideas but cast them into new relationships. It
would be a simplification to call the result either purely liberal or
republican.
On the one hand, republican principles continued to have an impact
on the terms of the franchise, but only in modified form. The republican precept that only the self-governing should exercise political authority, for example, was not abandoned. Rather, it was recast to make
use of the liberal idea that the self-governing were those who owned
and disposed of themselves. The republican notion that propertylessness and lack of autonomy go hand in hand also continued to shape
franchise qualifications. It persisted in the idea that property in one's
labor distinguished the independent from the dependent.
On the other hand, this nineteenth century regime of political rights
can hardly be called purely liberal. Voting rights were not completely
separated from social or economic status. They were divorced from'
property ownership, but taxpaying qualifications continued the tradition of imposing pecuniary restrictions on the franchise. In another
sense so did pauper disqualifications. 1 3 And women continued to be
excluded from the franchise precisely because of their dependent social
and legal status. The tale of suffrage reform in the early American republic thus is not a story of one coherent historical formation replacing
another-republican giving way to liberal-but a story of the ad hoc way
in which contradictory cultural materials were cobbled together under
pressure to produce a new accommodation.
Treating pauper exclusions as integral to the period has permitted
us to begin to understand the ways in which the new world of independent wage earners and dependent paupers rested on the flatly
contradictory premises that all men by nature are entitled to govern
themselves, but that if they own no property they are likely to be subject to the will of other men. The distinctiveness of this nineteenth century world did not lie in the coherence of its ideas, liberal or otherwise,
but in the contradictions on which it was built, and on the way those
contradictions were accommodated. At bottom this world was marked
131. See, for example, the arguments made in PROCEEDINGS, NEW JERSEY CONVENTION
OF 1844, supra note 89, at 87-88, 429-30.
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by an intense preoccupation with independence and dependence, but
what uniquely defined its spirit was that it simultaneously incorporated
two contradictory versions of that distinction. We might say that the
very split in the modem world which consigns property ownership to
one realm and governance to another took place as these contradictory
motivating ideas were accommodated.
Because it had emerged from, and rested on, contradictory premises, the tensions in this nineteenth century settlement continued to
subject it to revision in any number of directions. That all men were
entitled to govern themselves, but that only property ownership allowed them actually to do so, was a potentially explosive combination
of ideas. Despite the sophisticated ways in which the impact of those
ideas was limited, they continued to provide a fertile source of demands
for radical revision of the status quo.
It is by looking more closely at apparent anomalies like pauper exclusions that we gain access to worlds built on contradiction, whose appearance of solidity evaporates as we come to understand the ad hoc way
in which they have been constructed out of materials which had been
assembled in very different ways not long before. And we come to realize that these structures can be reassembled again. The human actors
in these worlds continue to have in hand abundant materials with which
to remake them, in any number of directions.

